



THE WORLD SITUATION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committees met, in joint session, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J.W. Fulbright, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Russell, Byrd (Virginia), Stennis, Jackson, Thurmond, Bartlett, Cannon, Saltonstall, Smith, Bush and Case (New Jersey), members of the Committee on Armed Services.

Also present: Senators Carroll and Miller (Iowa).

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson for Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Durden for Committee on Armed Services.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and will the press please leave the room.

This joint meeting was arranged in cooperation with Senator Russell to try to save the time of our officials, as well as the Senators, some of whom are on both committees, and I think it is a very excellent idea. We are very pleased to have with us this morning the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara and the Acting Director of the CIA, General Marshall C. Carter.

Secretary Rusk would like to open the meeting with a statement followed by Secretary McNamara.

General Carter will not have a formal statement.

For the benefit of the Senators who are here this is an executive meeting and we are very proud of our keeping it executive and not discussing with the press what is said here. I hope everyone understands that. I know the members of the committee do.

Senator Russell, will you have anything to say?

Senator RUSSELL. No, I have nothing to add to that, Senator. I agree this is a good idea to endeavor to let the people do some administrative work instead of spending all their time up here on the Hill. It is very difficult to have to go before two committees of each House and then the Appropriations Committees likewise, and it simplifies matters when it can be done. Of course, it isn't possible of achievement in all circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. We may be making history here, setting precedents we can follow more often, I hope.

Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Senator Fulbright, Senator Russell, we very much appreciate the willingness of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee to give us a chance to spend some time with you this morning. We thought it would be helpful to us as well as to you if we could, toward the close of the session, have a hard-hitting general review of where we seem to stand in some of our relations with the Soviet bloc, and to try to anticipate some of the key issues that will be ahead of us between the weeks and months before the end of the year.

In the interest of time and in order to get to the questions which are most on Senators' minds I thought I might open with a relatively short informal comment on a number of these questions.

Secretary McNamara will do the same and then we would go immediately into discussion of the points that are most interesting to members of the committees. I think we are all here in Washington impressed by the turbulence and complexity of the scene in which we find ourselves in the world these days.

TURBULENT TRANSFERS OF POWER

Just to illustrate in a very minor way, the United States has relations with about 107 countries. That means that on a statistical basis we can anticipate a change in government in 20 to 25 of these countries each year for as long as we can see into the future and since a considerable number of those governments do not have stabilized built-in peaceful methods of transferring power from one regime to another or one leadership to another, that means we can expect from 12 to 20 minor or major crises each year affecting our interests in some part of the world simply in the processes of changing governments out of so many independent nations.

I think it is also true so far as the free world is concerned, it is in the nature of free societies to reflect a certain turbulence of activity, political debate, criticism, adjustments as they try to get on with their business, and even in the free world where you have societies that have a political monopoly at the top but without the solid far-reaching totalitarian police state of, say, a Stalinist period, you do have turmoil connected with attempts on the part of those not in power to reach power despite the control system at the very top.

I am thinking of countries like Korea, for example, or Pakistan or Ghana or a number of those where there is no democratic process in the way in which we normally interpret it.

It is also true in the great alliances that the far-reaching agreements which exist within these alliances come to very little public attention because they are not normally considered as news, whereas relatively minor disagreements within an alliance turn out to be fairly substantial news. Sitting at almost the center of turbulence and complexity of that sort we sometimes get the impression that things are much more simplified in Moscow, that

things are easier and, I think, one point I would like to make today is that Moscow also is facing a good deal of complexity as it looks at its situation and the world scene.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP

I think there is no question but that Mr. Khrushchev is in a position of very strong personal leadership. We do not believe that his own personal position is basically threatened by force inside the Soviet Union. I think there is little question that he does exercise the dominant power in the Soviet Union at the present time. But that does not mean that he is free to act individually and personally as perhaps Stalin was able to do, because the phenomenon of collegiate rule does seem to be an increasingly important factor in the Soviet Government in recent years.

We do know there is lively discussion and debate at the top. We know there are differences among the leadership on important questions and that within that top leadership they face problems of allocating resources to different needs, to demands from different parts of their society and different aspects of their policy, and that collegiate rule is in fact the current characteristic of that top leadership. There have been some interesting rather small examples of the way this has operated from time to time.

You may recall that some months ago there was a joint declaration prepared in the Geneva disarmament conference on war propaganda. On a Friday of one week the Soviet delegate on instructions fully supported the declaration which he has helped to prepare. The Tuesday of the following week he completely reversed his position and indicated the Soviet Union had turned it down.

Our best guess is that although this was known to the top officials conducting foreign affairs in Moscow, that the Central Committee, over the weekend did in fact overrule the foreign office and perhaps Mr. Khrushchev himself and bring about that particular reversal. The handling of men like Molotov, the Stalinist who was strongly attacked by the Soviet Government, suggests there are contentions and stresses and some sort of maneuvering between the Stalinist group or the most conservative group on the one side and the revisionist group on the other.

I think it is also fair to say the Soviet leadership has to take into account more so than formerly the factor of Soviet opinion. The so-called de-Stalinization of the internal regime in the Soviet Union has permitted more discussion, more debate, has given somewhat more authority to scientists, to managers, to lower functionaries, and this in turn has led to more discussion, and more of what we would call public opinion poll. It still does not play a dominant role because the instruments are there for the government to play its power to a considerable extent but perhaps you can see the inroads of public opinion in a moderating direction but that is one of the factors Mr. Khrushchev has on some occasion adverted to and we see evidences of it in the Soviet Union.

SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

He has to consider the Soviet-Sino differences which exist in the tactical world which have to do with getting on with the Commun-

nist revolution which has to do within the Communist bloc with the issue of leadership between Moscow and Peking. Peking has rejected the primary of the Moscow leadership, and there are a number of things on which Moscow and Peking have not been able to see eye to eye, on such questions as trade and aid. There is good reason to believe in Peking they are resentful and critical of aid which the Soviet Union has been giving to countries outside of the Communist bloc at a time when China itself needs massive aid to try to recover from some of its almost impossible problems.

NATIONALISM WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

There are signs of increasing nationalism within the Communist bloc. I refer to the strong sense of nationalism which one finds in Poland, a growing sense of national assertion in Hungary, somewhat modified evidences of it in countries like Rumania, but I think in the long run we can see a growth in the idea of the idea of national Communist parties expressing their own views to Moscow and in Communist circles and not acknowledging the complete authority of the party in Moscow.

We all know that the Communist bloc has some very severe economic problems reaching from East Germany all the way around to North Vietnam, problems that are most dramatically illustrated in the agricultural field, basic problems of feeding their people, problems which do put pressures on the Communist leadership and force a very difficult problem in allocating resources among the many different needs of the Soviet bloc.

COMMUNIST ATTENTION TO THE COMMON MARKET

One of the more interesting aspects of their concern about the economic situation in recent months has been the growing attention they have been paying to the development of the Common Market. For a very long time the Communists have asserted as a matter of doctrine that development like the Common Market among capitalist nations is basically impossible and it would break up. In recent weeks and months they have seemed to have revised their views on that, seemed to have accepted the fact there is going to be a Common Market and to look to the prospect that the Common Market may in fact be enlarged and indeed strengthened and that they have a new problem as to how they work out their relationships in their own economic sector, and with how they deal with the phenomenon of the Common Market in the West.

Their council for mutual economic assistance which is the Communist bloc, so-called equivalent of the Common Market, has been meeting intensively both at the top and through all sorts of commissions and sub-commissions trying to develop their policy with respect thereto. It appears they are not thinking about the possibilities of bloc trade with the Common Market bloc while at the same time trying to carry on active propaganda and opposition to the idea of the Common Market among the underdeveloped countries and to try to stimulate fears in the non-Western part of the world that the Common Market is a device for trying to restore a kind of economic imperialism of the West throughout the world.

The Soviets are also finding themselves caught up in occasional disappointments among the underdeveloped countries where some of their aid programs have not paid the political dividends that they hoped and have found themselves caught in between as we have ourselves frequently been caught in between countries with whom they would like to maintain close relations but are bitterly hostile toward each other. For example, the Soviets would like to have close relations with both Iraq and Egypt but these two countries are at each other's throat and this has caused them the same kind of problems that we are familiar with over the year in similar type situations.

COMMUNIST GOAL OF WORLD REVOLUTION

There seem to be on occasion some elements of conflict between the state interests of the Soviet Union on the one side and the commitment of the Communists to a world revolution on the other. In a simplified illustration which I think is not specifically in their mind at the present time, would be the problem that if the Soviet Union were thinking chiefly of Russia and the Russian people, they could accept, objectively consider, that it might be in their interest to accept a considerable period of detente during which they would build up the Soviet Union, its internal resources, its economy including the army but leave the foreign policy field relatively quiet for, say, a decade while they geared themselves to their own national need. During which time they might disarm and mislead the intentions of the rest of us as to what their intentions are.

But their doctrinal intentions seem to stand as far as we can see, although their techniques for getting on with it may have changed and their constant pressure of the world revolution, among other things, is a constant alert to the rest of us that their purposes remain the same and that we have a very formidable job ahead of us. This is part of, at the center of our own problems in dealing with the Soviet Union. There is no question their appetites will grow and feed on any successes they have.

It is also true that frustration of the world revolution will force the Soviet Union to make some far-reaching and basic decisions on policy and that period will be one of some danger. Indeed, I think we are in such a period now because there were reasons to believe that Soviet leadership has been going through a far-reaching appraisal or reappraisal of policy, and that they are in the process of making some fairly important decisions.

I would like to comment very briefly, if I may, Mr. Chairman, on certain specific situations to which the committees might wish to return later simply to illustrate the variety and what seem to be their policy at the moment, and some of the issues we will have to be facing in the weeks ahead.

SOVIET PROPOSALS ON BERLIN

In Berlin, the insistent proposals of the Soviet Union for solution to the problem of Berlin run directly counter to the most basic and vital commitments of the Western world and to our own national interest so far as West Berlin is concerned. The Soviets have made a variety of proposals as to how to deal with West Berlin but all of

them seem to be variations of a single theme that somehow our position in West Berlin must be drastically reduced or eliminated before that matter can settle down. This is something for reasons these two committees will fully understand that the West cannot accept. It is something that, therefore, provides us with a very important direct and dangerous confrontation of the two power groups right there in the heart of Europe.

In the most recent period the Soviets seem to be in the process of trying to eliminate East Berlin, East Germany, from any discussion whatever and to concentrate their attention on West Berlin, and to consider West Berlin somehow as a four-power responsibility in a way that is not true of East Berlin.

This opens up the prospect that they will attempt a series of nibblings, so-called salami tactics, trying steadily to undermine the position in West Berlin until a defacto position has been brought about where our own position has been greatly reduced and the morale of the West Berliners could not stand up under the strain. The three Western powers have completed a very extensive contingency planning against these salami tactics. We think that it is important to limit the Soviet presence in West Berlin in ways that would be consistent with our interests.

When the Soviets attempted, for example, to build up their entry to the War Memorial through Friedrichstrasse, they attempted to do so without escorts. We insisted that we would send escorts, and the Soviets did not want the presence of Western escorts. When they used the armored personnel carriers that created a traffic hazard and seemed to step up their presence in West Berlin we insisted in the last few days they use a gate which is immediately adjacent to the War Memorial, instead of Friedrichstrasse. We were faced with a real issue there, but the Soviets did accept the gate at Sandkrug Bridge, as an alternative which is in the immediate vicinity of the War Memorial and creates much less of a problem.

But we can expect, I think, some salami tactics in the weeks ahead. We shall try to anticipate them and use what leverage we have on counter-tactics to meet the efforts of that sort.

BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER

I might say there is one aspect of Soviet presence in West Berlin in which we ourselves have an interest. Basically the Soviet presence there rests upon the War Memorial of the Spandau prison where the war criminals are being kept and the Berlin Air Safety Center. We would like to see the Soviets stay in the Air Safety Center because that is the means whereby allied flights in Berlin are signalled by the Soviets to air traffic controls in East Germany so ordinary air safety can be carried out. Now, they may leave that center almost at any time, and we have contingency plans to take account of that in order to go right ahead even if they do break up the Air Safety Center by withdrawing. But we would prefer that they themselves stay in it, and it may be that they will use their known interest in participating in the guard of the war criminals as some sort of quid pro quo on the one hand,

But I want to say to the committees that the allies are still very much together on the basic issues here in Berlin. We are working, I think effectively as a team; the only fundamental difference, has been that General de Gaulle has a different view as to strategy of the procedures and tactics in connection with contacts with the Soviet Union but on the basic underlying issues the alliance is solid.

LAOTIAN DECLARATIONS

In Laos the declarations, which were completed in Geneva some weeks ago, were in no sense the end of the Laotian question, they were the beginning. Everything turns on whether those declarations are carried out, because if they are not carried out, on the key issues which are of interest to us, then the declarations will dissolve and will be of no account.

I think the most critical things from our point of view would be, first, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos by early October which is the designated time, and second, the guarantee that Laos will not be used as an avenue of infiltration into neighboring states particularly into South Vietnam.

I think I can say that so far the attitude of the Soviet Union has been reasonably cooperative and reasonably cautious in Laos. We have had reasons to think that they themselves were acting with some restraint and were imposing some restraint on some of the other Communist members. But we still cannot be sure that we can get their full cooperation in carrying out the declarations and will be watching that very closely.

We think that Vietminh in Laos are in some cases going back to North Vietnam without being properly counted. We have some pretty good ideas as to how many are there and we think our intelligence will give us a pretty good indication in general as to whether there has been compliance with that part of the declaration. I think also if there were any significant movement of Vietminh withdrawal from Laos into South Vietnam that we would become aware of it.

Now, on the political side in Laos, there is minor encouragement in the fact that Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi seem to be cooperating on a number of important questions. There are tensions between Souvanna Phouma and Souvannavang, who is the Pathet Lao leader on the other, and there is some dissension within the Pathet Lao group itself.

But, nevertheless, we are not taking anything for granted there, and we will be watching that situation very carefully indeed. We cannot provide any assurance as yet that the declarations will, in fact, be carried out as intended, but we are working at it.

GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM

In South Vietnam the situation has not significantly changed in recent weeks. The South Vietnamese are making a considerable effort in the field. The village program is making some headway, but nevertheless, the guerrilla-type warfare there is one of the meanest and most difficult sort to deal with and we have no reason to think there will be early ending of that operation. We are mildly

encouraged at times and then we get setbacks which we regret. It looks as though it is going to be a difficult operation there, along the lines of the Malayan campaign and it will take some time to make any serious headway.

It is still true that President Diem has not succeeded in broadening the political scale base on which he is operating. If anything, I suppose, there has been some impression of restriction of that base in some action he has taken against so-called dissidents in his own country. But nevertheless, we think that some progress is being made.

SITUATION IN THE CONGO

In the Congo, the Soviet Union appears to be standing aside for the time being on a wait-and-see basis. Having been thrown out of the Congo by the Central Government shortly after the Congo became independent they shifted their efforts to the Oriental Province, and tried to build a pro-Communist group over the east of the Congo. But when the Central Government, through the United Nations, were able to establish reasonable control over that part of the Congo following the death of Lumumba and imprisonment of Gizenga, the Soviets shifted their emphasis and attention to Leopoldville and are now pursuing what seems to be a wait-and-see course.

We have been, I think, encouraged, by the response of Prime Minister Adoula on the one side and Mr. Tshombe on the other to the proposals recently made by the United Nations for a federal constitution and federal arrangement by which the Congo can become unified. From the Prime Minister's point of view he made a considerable concession in accepting the far-reaching federal arrangement as he did in fact accept. I think from Mr. Tshombe's point of view, his acceptance of the idea of federalism opens the way for a unification of the Congo with large autonomy to the provinces on matters of provincial concern. We are again not over the hump. There is a great deal of palaver still ahead, a great deal of negotiation on constitutional issues but we are interpreting what has happened in the past 2 weeks as a forward step and will build what we can on it.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have expressed distrust of such a Congo settlement and are trying to encourage those elements who would simply like to remove Tshombe from the scene and restore the disunity of the Congo by force.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA

In Cuba the principal thing has been the stepped up military assistance in the past few weeks. I think I might pause at this point to let General Carter give a brief summary as to what in fact has happened in Cuba in the last few weeks in increased military supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General Carter.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MARSHALL C. CARTER, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN WHITMAN

General CARTER. New information received from highly reliable sources over this past weekend has confirmed a considerable step-up and build-up in Soviet aid to Cuba, specifically in the areas of surface-to-air missile defenses, guided missile motor torpedo boats, and some land armament and artillery. Eight surface-to-air missile sites are now in process of being set up with an assembly area for the missiles just south of Havana. Two more sites appear to be in the offing, and there is equipment for a ninth site available. As we look ahead there is a possibility that we would have as many as 24 sites ringing Cuba.

Now, the small amount of permanent construction that has been put in there indicates quite clearly that the Soviets have gone ahead on this in a crash program. These sites, at least some of them, could be fully operational within another week or so. It takes approximately 125 technically trained personnel to operate a single site, and we have no information indicating that the Cuban are thus trained; consequently we look to Soviet technicians to man these sites for probably the next 9 to 12 months.

The capabilities of this missile system are substantially the same as our earlier versions of the NIKE, the NIKE Ajax. This means they have a range of about 25 to 30 miles, an altitude capability of up to about 80,000 feet. They do not have a low altitude capability and cannot fire below about 2,500 feet. Their maximum operating capabilities are within the area of about 10,000 to 60,000 feet.

All sites that we have now fully confirmed are on the western third of the island. However, further defector and clandestine sources have indicated a process of building up in the eastern section of the island.

SOVIET MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS

In addition to the surface-to-air missiles we have information that there are eight Komar class motor torpedo boats of Soviet design and manufacture. These carry two short-range ship-to-ship missiles on each ship. The boats themselves are capable of 45 knots and have a cruising radius of 300 miles. Some Cuban naval personnel have been trained in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are trained in this type of boat. These are in addition to the 13 motor torpedo boats and the six submarine chasers that we had previously reported earlier this year.

Now, our same highly reliable sources indicate that there has been some increase in tanks and in armored personnel carriers, and perhaps some in combat aircraft. We credit the Cubans with having now 60 Migs of the 15 and 17 class and about a dozen 19's. We have no indication they have any Mig 21's or any bombers.

SOVIET SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBA

Soviet shipments, as you know, have been drastically increased since mid-July and we total about 65 Soviet ships and bloc ships into Cuba since that time. Right now, there are 16 dry cargo ships

en route to Cuba, and we estimate that 10 of these probably contain military equipment and technicians.

We have on our books up until mid-July of this year they have been carrying about 500 military type technicians and several thousand agriculture and economic technicians. We have now increased this estimate in view of the influx to 1,700 military technicians in Cuba at the present time, and we believe that at least 1,300 more have just landed or are en route.

We would anticipate still more additional bloc technicians as the number of surface-to-air missile sites increase. These are all defensive type weapons of relatively limited capabilities. That is the status as of right now.

Are there any questions?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might make some further comments before we get to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

CUBA AS A SOVIET BASE

Secretary RUSK. This military assistance to Cuba is in general the same type the Soviet Union has furnished to certain other countries outside of the bloc such as Indonesia, on order, or for Iraq or for Egypt. Nevertheless, the fact it is Cuba in this hemisphere poses some very special problems for us, because it is a very expensive operation for the Soviet Union to bolster Cuba economically and militarily in the way they are now doing. We don't believe the Soviet Union will be putting in this vast expenditure, very substantial expenditure, just for Cuba although there are obviously some advantages on the political side in Cuba alone.

They, we suspect, look upon Cuba as a base to cause difficulty in the hemisphere. Therefore, we feel it is of the first importance for us to deal with that problem, to make sure that what is going on in Cuba is not exported into the hemisphere either through subversion or through illicit arms traffic or whatever it might be.

On that we have been working closely with the other countries in the hemisphere. I won't review for you the action taken at the Punta del Este conference in January, but I can say since that time we have been working closely with the military intelligence organizations of these countries as well as their political leadership to try to insure that they would have immediate information about illicit traffic in arms, and we would understand the techniques used by the Cubans in the hemisphere.

Thus far, the techniques appear to be chiefly the supply of money, intensive propaganda by powerful broadcasting stations from Cuba and training of personnel who come into Cuba from other Latin American countries.

SOVIET CAUTION

We have not been able to find any significant shipment of arms or any activity of that sort directly out of Cuba, and we suspect there is a certain caution in this matter on the side of the Soviets and Cubans because I am sure they know we would be looking for that and would be perhaps glad to catch them in the act in illegal arms shipments.

Now the situation, it seems to us, in Cuba would change in important respects if the Soviets were to establish their own military base there, submarine base, or if there were to be established in Cuba ground-to-ground missiles that would directly threaten the continental United States or Cuba's neighbors in the Caribbean, if there were a step-up of the role of Cuba in the general political and military situation rather than in the confrontation between the Soviets and the free world.

Thus far, we do not see that type of activity going on, and it is of some interest that the Soviets have held back from making a flat military commitment to Cuba of a military pact type. They have withheld making the types of commitments that they made to, say, the Warsaw Pact or to other members of the bloc in other parts of the world.

We think they are somewhat cautious about making an all-out commitment, and given the location of Cuba and the difficulties which they would have in making good on such commitment if there were serious trouble.

I would also say if there is any sharply increased crisis over Berlin due to their pressures on West Berlin, that that would also inevitably cause us to take another look at the Cuban situation to see what might be done under the conditions of greatly heightened crisis.

THE ISSUE OF CASTROISM

We still have in the hemisphere some problem with certain of the larger countries at a distance from the Caribbean, who are less interested in Cuba than they are in the great complex of their own internal problems. I think particularly of countries like Brazil and Chile; Mexico is rather a special case.

Castroism is a key issue in many of these countries. What led to the overthrow of the Frondizi government was the direct consequence of the attitude of Frondizi toward Castro.¹ It still is a key issue in the tense situation in Brazil, and we still do not have complete hemispheric solidarity. But, on the other hand, there has been strong emotion in the hemisphere away from Castro toward a recognition of the nature of this threat, and we have been encouraged by growing cooperation in this hemisphere.

COLLECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CUBA

We are concerned about the attitude of the other members of the free world on Cuba. They have not taken it as seriously as we have pressed them to do. A good deal of the shipping which is going into Cuba does come from free world sources.

When we take this up at governmental level as we have more than once, the problem seems to be that these governments claim to lack the legal ability to move directly on it. They point to some very practical problems from their point of view, because their chartering of ships to the Soviet bloc normally is on a bare bones

¹On March 28, 1962 Argentine President Arturo Frondizi was overthrown by a military coup. This action followed closely after congressional election victories by supporters of exiled dictator Juan Peron.

charter over time, so that there is no way of knowing at any particular time which ships chartered to the Soviet bloc will in fact be used in the Cuba trade.

Now, the Soviet bloc's use of free world shipping in the case of Norway, United Kingdom, Greece, countries that depend on their shipping services for a considerable part of their own foreign exchange necessities, creates a real problem for them economically unless we get into a situation with the bloc where general economic measures against the bloc can be taken.

We are discussing this further in the North Atlantic Council at NATO today, for example, to see what measures can be taken. We have had some cooperation from countries that has helped to a degree. Canada, for example, has taken action to prevent reshipment of anything coming out of the United States to Cuba. They have applied the Cocom list.

The Canadian exports to Cuba will drop from about \$35 million last year to about \$6 million or \$7 million this year. Part of that is due to the shortage of foreign exchange to Cuba and not necessarily to actions taken by the Canadian Government. We can come back to this in a moment, Mr. Chairman, if you wish.

PROBLEM OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

I would like to make just one very quick comment on disarmament and then conclude. We do not see on the side of the Soviet Union any serious interest in disarmament as in practical steps in the field of disarmament. In the field of nuclear testing the critical issue has been this past year and still is today the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspections.

We have been unwilling in recent weeks to talk about numbers of on-site inspections which might be possible as a result of the Vela tests. Our view has been so long as the Soviet number is zero there is nothing for us to talk about because we do not wish to negotiate the number of on-site inspections with the neutrals and with other countries. The reason for that being very simple, that whatever number we use will be subject to erosion and, therefore, to no avail, no point, no purpose.

We earlier had put in a proposal, we and the British, calling for 12 to 20 on-site inspections on a sliding scale related to the number of suspicious events.

Suppose we took 12. The neutrals would come along and say, "This is your proposal. Why don't we split the difference, why don't we make it six," and you recess your conference, come back a month later and at that point the neutrals will say, "Have you got something new, why don't you make six, four?"

There is just no point in going down that trail, so we have rigorously stayed away from talking about those numbers with those who don't count. If the Soviet Union wishes to talk seriously about on-site inspections and genuine arrangements for international control we will talk about it. So far they have said, "Nothing doing."

Similarly on general disarmament. Gromyko told me if we thought they were being stupid, there are suggestions made for nuclear testing this would be multi-

times over when we get to

complete disarmament, because inspection would be so much more intrusive into the Soviet Union.

There is one possibility in the disarmament field in which there might be some Soviet interest. We have had some indications that they might be willing to sit down and work out an arrangement that would try to interfere with the transfer of nuclear weapons to presently non-nuclear powers. We have an interest in that particularly as regards China. They have an interest in it particularly as regards Germany. We have been unwilling to make a deal on this with specific relation to Germany. The Soviets have recently indicated that they might be ready to talk about that on a world-wide basis, if we can find arrangements that would prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is the only glimmer of any relevance.

U-2 INCIDENT

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would say this U-2 incident was exactly what in fact it was said to be. One of our planes was on a course which would have kept it well outside of Soviet territorial waters or air but it was flying at night, very severe winds did come up, and it apparently blew it off course and it did go over the southern tip of the island and was picked up by Soviet radar.

We understand this morning that Moscow radio has played it straight as far as our announcement is concerned and we thought we would just tell the truth and prevent thereby the Soviets from making a great issue out of it on a policy basis. But we do believe that our pilot did fly over the end of the island and that the best way to handle it was simply to say so and let it go at that.

We do have a number of flights for all sorts of purposes going over international waters. Some of it connected with what the Russians call our national capability for detecting nuclear tests, air sampling and things of that sort and it is possible an occasional incident will occur. In this case it apparently did occur.

Mr. Chairman, what I have said indicates on easing up in Soviet policy. We do not see an indication of preparations to launch an overt military action against the West or against any of our military allies.

We do think there are many dangers in the situation but there are elements of caution on the Soviet side which I think we have to keep in our minds as well as the dangers. But certainly there is no indication from anything we can see that the United States or the free world can relax in our own efforts to get on with our job. I am quite sure if we do get on with our job in the free world, and encouragements about it, if we do get on our job that the worrying will have to be done by the Russians. If I had to draw a balance sheet, I think I would rather have the problems confronted by the free world rather than the problems confronted by Mr. Khrushchev.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary of Defense, do you wish to proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Russell, I will speak very briefly on our appraisal of the Soviet military power and policies and, I will answer any questions you may direct to us.

I think it is clear to all of us that the foundations of Soviet military power are their long-range strategic nuclear weapons. These have increased significantly in numbers over the past 24 months. They are continuing to increase, although neither the precise number of the force nor the rate of increase is as large as we had previously estimated.

These forces fall into four categories. The intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM], the medium range ballistic missiles [MRBM] the submarines launched missiles and their long-range aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The Soviets, we estimate, have today about 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles in operational condition. These could all be directed against this country. They have about 500 MRBMs, most of which are targeted against Western Europe. They have about 40 submarines, mostly diesel powered, perhaps 30 diesel powered and 10 nuclear powered, each capable of directing against this country about three ballistic missile with ranges of perhaps 350 miles, all of which have to be surface launched; they differ, therefore, significantly from the capability of our Polaris type submarines. They have about 165 long-range bombers and tankers, and about 950 medium-range bombers and tankers, and out of that total bomber tanker force of something on the order of 1,100 or 1,200 aircraft they could put about 200 bombers, we believe, over North America today.

NOT AS LARGE AS PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED

As I suggested these forces are not as large as had previously been estimated for this period, and while they are increasing they are not increasing as rapidly. Furthermore, our forces today are very much larger than the Soviet forces, and based on our forecasts, our strategic nuclear forces will continue to be considerably larger at all times within the next 5-year period, the period of our forecast.

Today we have about 1,500 long-range bombers, plus an additional 1,000 tankers associated with those long-range bombers and of that 1,500-bomber force about approximately half of the bombers are on 15-minute ground alert, ready to take off within that 15-minute period. Those bombers carry about 400 hounddog missiles, which are missiles that can be launched approximately 500 miles away from the target carrying nuclear warheads.

Furthermore, we have approximately 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles on launchers today, ready for launch, and beyond that we have about six to seven Polaris submarines operational today each of them carrying 16 missiles.

So our total aircraft and missile force and each of the sub-components of it, substantially exceeds the comparable Soviet force, roughly by a factor of two.

In total, we have on alert about 1,500 nuclear warheads. These are nuclear warheads that we believe can survive any strike by the Soviets, and it is this capability that leads us to make the statement that we have made in public, that we have a force sufficiently large to absorb a full Soviet first strike surprise attack against our nuclear forces, and survive with sufficient size to literally destroy the Soviet Union.

This has been our objective and will continue to be our objective.

RESULTS OF A NUCLEAR WAR

The Soviets have not built, and apparently they will not in the future, their strategic forces, particularly their missile forces, as rapidly as a maximum allocation of their resources would permit. But while our force is superior today, as I have outlined, superior in numbers, in power, and superior in survivability and while we believe it will continue to be superior in those terms in the years ahead, a nuclear exchange either today or in the period that I have outlined, the 5-year period ahead, would destroy both the Soviet Union and the Western world.

We estimate that the fatalities that result from such an exchange would approximate 50 to 100 million people in the Soviet Union, in the Western European nations and in the United States, 50 to 100 million in each of those three areas.

Now, whether it is 50 million or 100 million or whether, as a matter of fact, it is somewhat less or somewhat more of those figures, depends on the characteristics of the operation of the exchange but in any event it is perfectly clear to us and we believe it is clear to the Soviet Union that destruction of both the Soviet bloc and the Western world would result from a nuclear exchange. I say this despite the fact that we have a clear superiority in terms of numbers and we have a force so large as to survive with sufficient power following a first strike by the Soviets to literally destroy the Soviet bloc.

OTHER ASPECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Khrushchev appears to recognize the limitations of nuclear war as a tool of foreign policy and, therefore, he appears to be placing increasing emphasis on three other aspects of military operations: First, the maintenance of large conventional forces, non-nuclear forces. Second, the maintenance and probably the increase of military assistance programs to non-bloc countries.

The military assistance programs of the Soviet Union are very substantial. Since World War II they appear to have provided military assistance in one form or another to bloc countries totaling between \$10 and \$15 billion, and since 1955 they appear to have provided military assistance to non-bloc countries totaling in excess of \$2 billion and currently it appears to be running at the rate of several hundred million dollars a year. I think you are familiar with many of those programs, as Secretary Rusk mentioned, they have applied them particularly to Iraq, to Egypt, to Cuba, and to Indonesia.

So they appear, therefore, to be placing increasing emphasis as I have suggested on three aspects of their military operations, first,

conventional forces; second, the military assistance programs to non-bloc countries, and third, the form of subversive operations and covert aggression that we see going on today in Southeast Asia, particularly in South Vietnam, the type of operation that Khrushchev labeled the war of liberation in that famous speech of January 6, 1961.

NON-NUCLEAR POWER

We believe this pattern of military operation and military power application by the Soviet Union will continue, and we believe it will support a program of diplomatic pressure and small unilateral steps by the Soviet Union designed to whittle away the Western position throughout the world.

Although the stated Soviet position is that the limited war or the non-nuclear war will grow inevitably into nuclear wars, these public statements appear primarily designed to deter the West from developing its non-nuclear power, and from the local use of such non-nuclear power.

We believe, however, if at all possible, the Soviets would employ political means to prevent the escalation of non-nuclear military operations into nuclear operations wherever possible, assuming, of course, that the non-nuclear power of the West is maintained at high levels, and that the Soviets could not snatch a quick and easy victory.

In summary then, we believe that the Soviets hope to confront the West with continuing political pressure, with subversion of various forms, with unconventional warfare, all under their umbrella of their growing strategic nuclear power. Therefore, we must continue to shape our military force so as to provide credible military options over a wide spectrum of contingencies, ranging all the way from all-out nuclear war to the very minor forms of aggression at the other end of the scale, and that our own strategic forces must remain so strong that they will deter the Soviet nuclear forces, deter Soviet nuclear action and thereby permit us to apply our expanded non-nuclear power to meet the Soviet confrontation wherever that may occur and at whatever level that may occur.

Mr. Chairman. I will be very happy to answer any questions.

CAPABILITY OF DESTROYING EACH OTHER

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you correctly, your estimate about the effect of nuclear war was 50 to 100 million in each of three areas or altogether.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, in each of three areas.

The CHAIRMAN. In each of three areas.

Secretary McNAMARA. I mention this with some hesitancy, because the character of a nuclear exchange has a great effect upon the estimate of the—if I said casualties, I should have said fatalities, I meant fatalities—and whether the fatalities total 50 to 100 million or whether it might range between 30 and 120 million is questionable, but I use 50 to 100 million because I do want to emphasize that when we have 1,500 warheads, roughly [deleted] megatons, in our alert force, all launchable within 15 minutes, and all capable, therefore, of surviving a Soviet first strike, and when they

have perhaps half that that can be launched against the West, we each have a capability of literally destroying the society of the other. We actually have made calculations, very detailed calculations, based upon specific target analysis, and specific damage assessment analysis which do support the figures I gave you of 50 to 100 million fatalities in each of the three areas, Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You emphasize fatalities as distinguished from casualties, including what are the side effects of those who would survive?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

The fatality figures of 50 to 100 million would include those who die within approximately a week of the initial attack.

IRRATIONALITY OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk, on your long-range policy, if I understood you correctly in your summary, you said you felt that you do not believe they are anticipating any overt military action provided we pursue our present policy, is that correct?

Secretary Rusk. That is the judgment of the Department and the intelligence community. But I would point out in relation to what Secretary McNamara just said the irrationality of a nuclear exchange does not provide the guarantees that you might think it might provide. Because if two sides come to the table and each one is utterly convinced that under no circumstances will the other side fight a nuclear war, it is a pretty good way to have a nuclear war because one side or the other would overreach into vital interests that would just be unacceptable to the other side. Therefore, I don't think we can take too much comfort in the factor of irrationality as a deterrent to nuclear war when such issues such as Berlin are involved.

STRENGTH THROUGH TRADE

The CHAIRMAN. One last question: Assuming the Common Market, which you commented on with regard to Khrushchev, does develop and Europe does proceed to, in a sense, federation—and they are talking very much of political federation now—and we are able to adjust to it, what effect would this have upon our relations with the Soviet bloc?

Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that would be one of the most important forward movements of the strength and unity of the free world that we could find, and I think this would be reflected in growing caution on the part of the Soviet Union. This is not just in economic terms but also will be reflected in political and military terms.

Western Europe, if it were really unified, and the North Atlantic Community, if we really developed the relationships that all of us have been discussing in the last few years here in this country, would be a nexus of special relationships reaching right around the world, with our relations with Latin America, and with the countries in the Pacific, the British with the Commonwealth, and the French with the French-speaking countries, Germany is establishing some interesting relationships with selected countries. This

could be a focus of influence, assistance, help and strength that would go far beyond the North Atlantic Community itself. I think this would be a great impetus for the free world.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to propagandize for any particular bill, but is this what is involved in this trade bill? Does it have overtones of strategic value other than just trade or is it just a trade bill?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would think that the purely trading aspects of the trade bill are not as important really in the longer run as the great political objectives of the free world, that are now gathering around the issues of trade in the Common Market and across the Atlantic and between that association and countries in other parts of the world. I think the political aspects of the trade bill to me are even more important than the sheer trading aspect.

LESSEN FOREIGN AID BURDEN

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't that also imply the possibility that the burden on us of this worldwide foreign aid program can be lessened? Isn't it the only way it can be and still provide security as the Secretary said?

Secretary RUSK. We have been working very hard, as you know, in the development assistance group of the OECD to get our other friends more and more into the aid business. I think we should try to work toward more division of labor in this field.

I would hope we could find a time when the Europeans would, for example, make a concentrated substantial effort on the continent of Africa so we don't have to build up there the same intensive effort that is necessary, for example, in our own hemisphere and I think that prospect of division of labor is already beginning to make itself known, and I think we can look forward to a greatly enhanced free world effort in this field.

The CHAIRMAN. Just having gone through a primary, I can assure you that foreign aid is the most unpopular of all the issues before the country. I think you ought to know that as a practical and political matter.

Senator Russell, will you proceed?

TEST BAN RATHER THAN DISARMAMENT

Senator RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright, this entire briefing has given such a wide spectrum it is almost impossible to know where to approach it without consuming more time than any one member could fairly be allotted.

Secretary Rusk, does the world generally look on these negotiations for a ban on nuclear testing as a preliminary for more general disarmament?

Secretary RUSK. I think that there are those who hope that it would. I think a careful examination of the Soviet attitude on general disarmament would show that a test ban would not necessarily lead to sweeping measures of disarmament. Senator, if I could comment on that for just a moment and I am not sure that General Carter and Secretary McNamara would necessarily agree with this 100 percent, I think they would. About a year ago, perhaps a

little earlier, the Soviet Union made a basic decision to rearm substantially in the missile and nuclear field, and that they simply are not at the present time interested in a genuine test ban.

Now, I say that because if they were seriously interested they could not possibly have turned down the treaties that had been offered to them last April, for example.

CONCERN ABOUT CONCESSIONS

Senator RUSSELL. That is just what I was coming to. I had apprehended that the world was looking on that as a preliminary to further disarmament, and I have been very deeply concerned about our continuing concessions in an effort to get something with which the Russians would agree. It would seem to me that, after we had made about two concessions and they have stood adamant right where they were at the beginning and offered nothing whatever, we would have slowed down because I think we are setting a stage where they will demand that we play on when we come to the other disarmament and we would be terribly handicapped if we continue this policy.

It would seem to me to be most foolish to be weakening our inspection from time to time because if we get into disarmament of conventional weapons without any inspection we are undone then completely. Are we planning any more concessions other than we have made now? We won't inspect in the air, under water, on the surface or underground. We have given up almost everything.

Secretary RUSK. The proposals in that field turn on our own capability of detecting atmospheric tests, and under ground.

The concessions on control posts, for example, are a direct result of improved technical capability to use instrumentation for purposes of detection.

I would not myself have supposed that those were in the normal sense concessions, because it simply meant we could do more efficiently and at less cost what had to be done to assure ourselves that no underground tests were in fact going on.

But, I must say, I think, Senator, we are at the point where the key issue of inspection is now laid bare, the Soviets are saying no inspection. We don't see how we can proceed without adequate inspection, and, therefore, I cannot be very optimistic at this point as to what is going to happen in the disarmament field although we think we have to stay in session and fully expose the necessity for adequate inspections and control if actual steps in disarmament are going to be accomplished.

CONCEDED TOO MUCH WITHOUT QUID PRO QUO

Senator RUSSELL. Don't you think there is a very great danger that the Soviets will think we have become awed by this horrible prospect of holocaust that would wipe out about half the people of the Earth and they could, therefore, almost dictate their own terms to us? It seems to get right back to what you stated a moment ago, that one side gets the impression that the other will yield because of the prospect that we will have an atomic war.

I frankly have been very unhappy about the last proposals that have been made. I think we have conceded too much without any quid pro quo at all on the part of the Russians.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is always hard to know what is exactly in the Soviet mind, but it is my impression that their decision to go into a significant rearmament program was based upon pretty good estimates as to what our capabilities were, and the knowledge that they had important deficiencies and those deficiencies had become known to us, and rather than feeling that we were awed they had to take steps to try to build up their own strength.

RESTRICTING TRADE WITH CUBA AND CHINA

Senator RUSSELL. What is the official policy of the United States with respect to dealings with countries like Canada and Mexico, with Cuba and with China? Do we have any policy?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, we have. We do take up with these governments the importance of restricting their contacts with and trade with Cuba. This is not something that they find easy to do within their own systems and their own political situation. We have made, I think, considerable headway with the Canadians who have been, I think, more helpful than any other members of NATO.

Senator RUSSELL. Did we make any headway with Canada at the time they sold surplus wheat to China and Cuba until they had run out of American dollars?

Secretary RUSK. For some time now they have taken rigorous measures to prevent, for example, re-export of American supplies through Canada which was plugging one hole that was important for us, and have permitted us to discourage Canadians with American affiliations to stay in the Cuba trade.

CUBAN FOOD IMPORTS

Senator RUSSELL. What is the food situation in Cuba?

General CARTER, you, perhaps could answer that better than the Secretary.

General CARTER. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. Do they have to rely on exports to a large extent?

General CARTER. Yes, sir, they are having a rough time and it is getting no better rapidly. They are under extensive rationing of staples and meats.

Senator RUSSELL. How about medicines and equipment for hospitals?

General CARTER. They are also short of those, sir. They are dependent almost entirely now on Soviet and bloc imports.

Senator RUSSELL. Industrial machinery, such as it was, was composed almost entirely of American manufacture. Are they having any trouble now with their replacement and spare parts?

General CARTER. They are having a great deal of trouble, sir. Whenever a major item of equipment goes out for assembly or spare parts failure it is almost invariably stood down until they can get a part pre-built and shipped over from the bloc.

Senator RUSSELL. I noticed in the press a number of Liberian ships were engaged in these deliveries to Cuba. Aren't they American owned? Don't we have any control at all over that?

Secretary RUSK. It is not my impression, Senator, that Liberian flagships are playing nearly as important a role in the Cuban trade as Norway, United Kingdom, Greece and so on.

Senator RUSSELL. I think that is true but some are.

Secretary RUSK. But if they were American-owned, I think that the action should be applied. I will look into it and see what action can be taken. I would be surprised if American owned Liberian ships were involved.

MILITARY CHECKPOINTS IN BERLIN

Senator RUSSELL. I was very pleasantly surprised on the Russian request that they use some entrance other than Checkpoint Charlie. Was any approach made to them other than through military channels in Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, this was handled by the Commandant.

Senator RUSSELL. The State Department did not handle it?

Secretary RUSK. We did not go behind the scenes.

Senator RUSSELL. Nor Adenauer or any of our associates?

Secretary RUSK. This was handled on the basis of the three-party, three-power agreement in Berlin and we left the Commandant to handle it with the Soviet military powers. I mean there was no trading done on that point, for example.

U.N. POLICY ON CONGO

Senator RUSSELL. Just how was the recent policy devised that Mr. U Thant announced with respect to the Congo? Did the United Nations have a committee that got up that policy or was it the brainchild of Mr. U Thant?

Secretary RUSK. It is a combination of influences there. I think that the principal move toward a federal structure came from the first indication on the part of the parties in the Congo that they might be interested in a federal structure. Then we, the British, the French and the Belgians who had some possibility of bringing some influence to bear in the Congo directly helped put together some suggestions about a federal constitution.

Mr. U Thant, encouraged by the information about the probable reaction of the Congolese, adopted that as his own approach to it, and put that to the parties. I would say that U Thant's role in this is influenced both by people like ourselves and also by the Afro-Asian group who are furnishing troops there and the so-called Congo Advisory Committee, and that these are based on a number of contacts with a number of governments.

We did not particularly, ourselves, like the reference to sanctions which he put into his public statement on the ground that the effort of conciliation ought to have full chance to run on its own without implied threats in the background.

He was under other pressures at the United Nations and made references to it and so far apparently that reference to sanctions has not been a major impediment in the Congo in getting an agreement.

SOVIET GUARANTEES TO CUBA

Senator RUSSELL. I don't want to monopolize the time. I have just one other question there.

You said that Russia has not entered into any formal agreement with Cuba. What importance do you attach to Mr. Khrushchev's declaration that they would feel bound to come to the assistance of Cuba in the event of any attack or intervention in Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that our analysis of that declaration would indicate that in the wording he was careful to leave himself without a flat commitment of a security guarantee type, and that they have been very reluctant to undertake that commitment even though the Cubans have pressed him on it.

There is some reason to believe that Castro's declaration of Marxist-Leninist commitment in December of last year was not very pleasing to Moscow, because it took away from Castro some of his influence in Latin America, on the one side, and second, it seemed to be part of a pressure on Moscow to get a security commitment of a sort which the Soviets have been reluctant to give.

But I would be glad to have a little study of that sent over to you so you can see our analysis of those declarations.²

Senator RUSSELL. I would be interested in that. I am gratified they haven't signed any agreement but I think there would be considerable loss of face if he didn't do it.

Mr. Chairman, I won't take any more time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

DE GAULLE'S VIEWS ON BERLIN

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief because other members want to ask questions. I want to ask you about the statement you made regarding de Gaulle having his own ideas with reference to the Berlin situation? Just what is his view?

Secretary RUSK. General de Gaulle is in a minority of one in NATO on this particular point of contact with the Soviet Union on the subject of Berlin. His view is that you should not discuss the matter in any way with the Soviet Union until you have a so-called acceptable basis of negotiation. Well, it is a little hard to get to that point without contacts.

In any event the rest of us have felt that because the Berlin question is so dangerous, because it is the one question that really can blow things up into a major war, it would be irresponsible not to maintain at least a contact with the Soviet Union, to have a channel by which you can exchange views even if they were diametrically opposed.

Now, such contacts do not mean you give away any vital interest or you agree to things that are not agreeable. But we think it is important for these heads of government and the governments concerned to be in touch with each other, to try to find a way to manage so dangerous a problem without a world war, and as a matter of fact, if we could leave this particular comment off the record—

² See Appendix C.

[Discussion off the record.]

CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN

Senator SPARKMAN. In speaking of these contacts, not necessarily that we have, but contacts as between the people of West Berlin and East Berlin, to what extent do they have joint sessions or joint commissions or trade with one another?

Secretary RUSK. There is very little contact, unfortunately, between the West Berliners and the East Berliners either at the private or official level. Mayor Brandt is very much interested in trying to find some way to punch holes through the wall by restoring contacts between families or between the administrators of city utilities.

But so far that has not been possible because the East Germans, Ulbricht, will not allow the East Berliners to deal with the West Berliners on such questions. Now, there is, however, a great deal of contact between the West Germans and the East Germans.

Under their interzonal trade arrangement, they are exchanging several hundred million dollars worth of trade each year and they have had several discussions at a technical trade level and it is there that key questions of civilian supply to West Berlin, trade to West Berlin, as well as with East Germany are worked out.

You see, about 95 percent of the traffic into West Berlin is handled through civilian German channels, and much of that is West German, and the West Germans travel freely into Berlin along the autobahn. Occasionally there is some incident, some arrest of some sort, but they go by the hundreds of thousands and there is free traffic between East and West Germans.

Now, the contacts between East and West Germans are far more extensive than our own, and when questions come up such as nervousness about a particular question by international excess authority applied to East Germany we find ourselves a little surprised because we are not the ones doing business with them, it is our friends in Western Europe. They are the ones supplying the business in East Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

POLITICAL EFFECT OF EUROPEAN UNITY

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Mr. Secretary, you implied that the advantages of the Common Market were important politically. Will you elaborate a little more on that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I just indicated from the point of view of our discussion today in these great political relationships between the free world and the Soviet Union, that the political effect of the unification of Europe and a close relationship between the United States and that kind of Europe, and a right trading relationship between that Atlantic Association and countries in other parts of the world, will have very important and far-reaching political implications. I would think those were a major element in any approach to such a problem.

Senator BYRD. You mean draw those nations closer together?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; for example, the United States got into two world wars because of wars that started in Western Europe. I

think we are almost in position to be able to say that surely if the Common Market proceeds as they expect, we can really say for the first time perhaps in 500 or 600 years, that wars are not going to start within Western Europe. This is a very great thing in the history.

Senator BYRD. Wait a minute, how many years?

Secretary RUSK. I would say 500 or 600 years.

Senator BYRD. Five or six hundred years?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. That is a long time.

Secretary RUSK. All of these rivalries that have gone on for centuries in Western Europe are now being brought to a conclusion. This is a very important thing for us.

WOULD U.S. ENTER COMMON MARKET?

Senator BYRD. What I am leading up to, what would be our position? Do you visualize the fact that we would enter the Common Market or ask to enter the Common Market at any time in the future?

Secretary RUSK. I would not see in the foreseeable future our entering the Common Market, because the European Common Market would also carry with it political implications with regard to the political unity in Europe and we probably would not for some time, in any event, be able or willing to take up because of our different responsibilities in this hemisphere and other parts of the world.

But I do think as the President indicated in his July 4th speech that that kind of Europe and the United States and Canada, can grow increasingly closer together and work as a team on more and more subjects so that the total military and economic impact would be one of joint action and unity. But I don't see a development in a constitutional form. At the moment if that were suggested it would scare the Europeans to death.

Senator BYRD. I am not talking about the constitutional point. But what do you consider our position should be with respect to the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. I think it ought to be—

Senator BYRD. If not being a member, at any time in the foreseeable future what will be our position?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that we ought first to be in position of broadly encouraging the success of the negotiations that are now going on between the Common Market and Great Britain in the first instance, and with Norway, Denmark, and Ireland as a second consideration.

But I do not believe that we should ourselves try to spell out in detail or provide a blueprint for those negotiations. That is chiefly on the European side nor should we try to tell the Europeans exactly what form their own political association in Europe should take.

They are perfectly capable of working it out for themselves. But it seems to me, sir, if we can get the kind of authority that is asked for in the trade bill that we can then move to insure our own market opportunity in the Common Market and at the same time

prevent the North Atlantic Community from becoming a little in-grown trading community at the expense of our trading relations in other parts of the world.

In other words, bring that association across the Atlantic into a profitable trading relationship with the non-Western part of the world.

COMMON MARKET PARTNERSHIP

Senator BYRD. Secretary Hodges³ indicated he had thought our position would be that we would be a partnership in the Common Market. Would you define that, exactly what that would mean if we are not in the Common Market, and what is a partnership?

Secretary RUSK. I am not familiar with the context in which he used that word, Senator, but I would suppose that he was referring to the fact that the Common Market and we would be great trading partners, because we have a vital interest in flourishing trade with Europe.

Senator BYRD. We have always had it.

Secretary RUSK. And those would be, I believe myself, increased and the opportunities for American exports to Europe would grow as the standards of living in Europe grow and the extent of trade between the two areas would expand.

Senator BYRD. When we would negotiate, would we negotiate with the Common Market as a whole or with each individual nation of the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. This would depend somewhat on the arrangements worked out on the European side. At the moment we would take these matters up as a part of our multilateral negotiations in which each country participated.

Senator BYRD. Would you take it up through GATT? ⁴

Secretary RUSK. That would be one of the principal forums in which we would take it up, yes, sir.

But we would have to reinforce those negotiations with constant bilateral diplomatic discussion in capitals.

Senator BYRD. What is the relation between GATT and the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. GATT has a broader membership, and includes countries that would not be either members of or associated with the Common Market, but we would assume that in the Common Market they themselves would develop common trade policies, and we would negotiate with them some matters, I am sure directly, and on other matters in GATT in the broader forum that is present.

Senator BYRD. As I understand it our relations with the Common Market would be a matter of growth?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

RECIPROCAL TRADE AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Senator BYRD. You expect it to be a gradual growth, and is it based on the reciprocal trade idea?

³ Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges.

⁴ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Or is it based on the political side?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be based on both, Senator, that we do want to share fully in the trading opportunities that an expanding Common Market would offer as well as to protect our own present trading position. But at the same time, this is spurred by the great political impact of a vibrant and successful economy in the Western world.

I think really that one can see signs of the fading of the balloon or Communist propaganda in many parts of the world. One of the reasons is they have shown themselves not to be competitive with the rest of the Western world at the very point at which the Communists made their greatest claims, namely, to take care of the economic needs of their people. This contrast between Eastern and Western Europe has made the point and you see the effect of it all over the world.

Senator BYRD. One other question. The main factor for the future, would it be promoting reciprocal trade or promoting the political situation that you just mentioned?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, those two go hand in hand. I don't see how you can separate one from the other because they both feed back into each other in important ways.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

SOLUTION TO CONGO SITUATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, in the Congo, has there been any formalized acceptance or paper statement with regard to the proposed constitutional arrangements there or is it just a statement of U Thant that Tshombe said verbally to him?

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, there has been a statement of the central principles of a federal solution put to Prime Minister Adoula and to Mr. Tshombe and they both have come back and accepted this in basic principle, and are ready to talk now about drafting a constitution and taking some of the other steps necessary to give it effect.

I would be glad to have that paper furnished to the committee so you can have it available.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a statement in the press, I think, last night or this morning, that there had been no formal agreement except the verbal statement by Tshombe to Mr. U Thant, that he would agree in principle to this discussion of it. I don't know just what it was.

Secretary RUSK. I would think, sir, it would be just a little more than that, because this was an outline of a federal constitution. It did not have every clause drafted because that is something that has to be done with the participation of the parties. But it was the outline of a division of power between the central government and the provinces which is the key element, of course, on whether you can get on with such a constitution. A team is there now to start the drafting with the participation of the parties.

CUBA AND THE WARSAW PACT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Going to Cuba for just a minute, is there any evidence or do you or anybody here have any information that Cuba and the Soviet bloc contemplate adherence to the declaration of the Warsaw Pact by Cuba in the future, assuming some of these preliminary military and technical installations are a little more stabilized?

Secretary RUSK. I haven't seen that, have you, General?

General CARTER. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Allegations have been made that it is only a few weeks before a declaration of adherence or association with the Warsaw Pact would be coming from Cuba.

Secretary RUSK. I have nothing on that, sir. I would be a little surprised if that would occur.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would be surprised if other sources had that information and we did not have it.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

So far as the action of the Common Market and our association with it is concerned, I certainly agree that the political possibilities or potentials or implications of the Common Market in the future are important in addition to the trade situation, but do you think it is important that we know or that there are finalized the arrangements or agreements of Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries so far as the Common Market countries are concerned?

Wouldn't that be an important phase in connection with our association with the Common Market?

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure, Senator, that our relations with our friends on the other side of the Atlantic, that is, the form of our relations would be very much affected by the results of the present negotiations between the Common Market and Great Britain, and this would be true in the political as well as in the trade field.

I do think that these discussions will succeed because I get the impression that in Western Europe they recognize that the problems of failure are now at least as important as the difficulties of success, and, therefore, in the last several days we have had encouraging news about the probable course of these negotiations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point of my question was this, if Britain and the Commonwealth countries and their trade influence are not to become a part of the Common Market, it would not become a part of the market, that would pose one set of problems for us.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If Britain and the Commonwealth countries do become a part of the Common Market, that might conceivably change our posture and attitude toward the whole Common Market complex, don't you think that would be the case?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would involve such questions, for example, as those items on which we and the Common Market together produce, say, 80 percent of the total world production—

COMMON MARKET AND NATO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am not talking, especially emphasizing economic good, I am talking about the whole ball of wax here, the whole political future of Western Association or Western Europe Association, its possibilities and the economic side as well.

I am just asking if the participation or non-participation of Britain and the Commonwealth countries in the Common Market would not pose a different set of circumstances to some extent vis-a-vis ourselves.

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure it would, sir. I would think, for example, if Britain were a member of the Common Market, and they moved for a rather close political unity, this could affect the way in which we handle defense and political questions in NATO. It might affect the actual defense of NATO itself on the military side, the processes of consultation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am concerned about the wisdom of how far we get into involvement in the Common Market until we know whether this whole great British complex, that is Great Britain and the various Commonwealth countries and this great trading complex, how they become involved. I think it would be very important as to our attitude with respect to the Common Market as it becomes a matter of permanence.

Secretary RUSK. I think a great many of these questions are being postponed by governments until they see what the results would be of the Common Market negotiations, the questions of nuclear policy---

SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND NUCLEAR WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One question, I am trying to hurry on, because there are others here who would like to ask questions: One question about the Communist attitude on the question of war and destruction or the deterrent to destruction, that is, the theory that they will be deterred from military action because of retaliation and mutual destruction of the two countries. It seems to me that inherent in the whole international Communist movement, beginning with the Bolshevik revolution at the end of World War I, they were not in any way involved in any humanitarian considerations. They were involved in considerations of control of power and they were willing to destroy themselves and their own institutions on the old Marxian theory that you have to have the blood purge, you have to completely eliminate these offending and interfering forces and start anew, start from the bottom to build.

If that philosophy still continues, and I have no doubt it does, in the thinking of the Communists and their world conquest philosophy, it would seem to me that the question of whether or not they could destroy us utterly and Western Europe completely would be only an incident in their consideration as to whether or not they could do it first.

If they could do it first and destroy us, humanitarianism would have no place in their thinking, and probably the only possible deterrent they would have would be if we could retaliate and in our dying gasp, put the sword to them.

Secretary RUSK. I think this is critical and I hope Secretary McNamara will make a comment on this. The knowledge that they will be destroyed even if they destroy first is very essential to us in dealing with the Soviets.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is absolutely critical. It is my own personal view, and I think it is the view of others in the government, that it is not the humanitarian considerations that are deterring the Soviets. It is only one thing, the fact that we have, as I suggested, [deleted] megatons in our alert force that can survive any first strike that we or they can conceive of against us today and with that [deleted] megatons can literally destroy the nation.

I spoke only of a portion, I spoke only of 50 to 100 million in the Soviet Union. It would have associated with it destruction of 80 to 90 percent of their industrial capability, of all of their military capabilities of any substance or size, and moreover, it is our plan to double that force within the next 5 years, and we have received from Congress this year in fiscal 1963 appropriations to undertake the major part of that doubling program.

KHRUSHCHEV'S OBSESSION OVER BERLIN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One last question, Secretary Rusk and perhaps Secretary McNamara would care to answer this, too: How do you consider the Berlin situation as a focal point of crisis today? Its proportion is hard to define, but it is a focal point in crisis today, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Considering the Russian buildup over the years and considering the long delays and the repeated statements of the Kremlin that the East German situation has to be resolved and is going to be resolved and repeated statements that they are going to sign peace treaties and so on and the position it has put them in, how do you rate the tensions and the dangers inherent in the Berlin crisis today as compared to the historic background of this whole Berlin situation, as compared to the airlift period, let's say?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, Senator, that they are more dangerous than they have ever been before and partly because in the last 3 years the Soviet Union has developed an enormous capability of wreaking destruction on the West and this itself makes a little bit more dangerous situation. I was interested in U Thant's remarks that Khrushchev seems to have an obsession over Berlin. I think there is a good deal in this, and so I think this is more dangerous than it has been since 1945.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, to illustrate roughly the purpose of my question, Hitler said if he did not succeed he would pull the world down for a thousand years or something of that kind.

The attitude of the dictator or of a centralized power of a group is: "If we can't have our way we will destroy everybody else along with us, if we are destroyed." Do you think there is a danger today that in desperation they might go on some adventures of destruction if they feel they are not prevailing?

Secretary RUSK. There is always that possibility where human frailties are involved but I am inclined to think that Khrushchev

still has those essential elements of rationality about him so that is not really the problem.

I think at the present time he is doing his best to see how far he can get within a certain range of risk, but on the other hand, I think that there is a danger that he would underestimate the unity and determination of the West and make the mistake—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I read here about Mr. Khrushchev's statements, it seems to me they are about as erratic and emotional as Mr. Hitler's were under slightly different circumstances, so I am not so sure he is any more rational when it comes down to his emotional statements, anyway.

Now, what he will do in action I don't know, but it seems to me his statements are about as emotional and inflammatory as Hitler's.

Secretary RUSK. Of course, there are a good many ways, good many steps in which this matter can further be taken up, United Nations and other steps of that sort so we have a full chance to explore this question of rationality if matters get worse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you this.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON CUBA

The President made a very strong statement this morning as I listened on the radio, that is all I know.⁵ How much must we discuss with the OAS or the South American countries before we would reach a decision as to how to followup on that statement if we want to do it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think in a closed executive session of this sort, I would say this: Basically we start from the elementary security interests of the United States in a matter of this sort.

From that point of view, the commitments that we have undertaken for more than 100 years under the Monroe Doctrine are part of that elementary national interest necessity of the United States. But since the late twenties and early thirties as we move into a good neighbor policy, we have tried to put the security interest of this hemisphere on a multilateral basis, Rio pact, developments of that sort.

I think it would be very important for us to do everything possible within the multilateral framework, but if that proves impossible at a time when our vital security interests are genuinely at stake as a national matter we might have to take some action regardless of the other members of the hemisphere.

Now, what we are trying to do at the present time, as Senator Morse and Senator Hickenlooper observed at Punta del Este, is trying to mobilize the hemisphere to a serious regard for this problem. We have had only partial success, because Brazil, Chile and some others are preoccupied with other matters. Our first object ought to be to deal with it as a hemisphere matter but if we have to we might have to deal with it as a national matter.

⁵ On September 1, President Kennedy pledged to take whatever means necessary to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force" in Latin America.

WEAPONS OF A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER

Senator SALTONSTALL. If I might perhaps make an observation and a question. It seems to me we want to be awfully careful how far along we get in making a statement before we take an action.

Now, for 15 more Soviet ships coming across, with arms of various kinds and more technicians, when does the time come when we live up to that statement that the President made this morning of which I approve?

Secretary RUSK. At the heart of the statement this morning was a direct assurance to all the members of this hemisphere that the armed forces in Cuba are going to stay at home.

We won't let them interfere with or threaten other countries in this hemisphere. We would undoubtedly move with association with other friends, because they would want us to do so. In other words, the Caribbean countries who do feel themselves threatened would act with us in a circumstance of that sort.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So you are convinced from what General Carter's information and the CIA and so on gives us that the actions of the Russians in assistance to Cuba up to the present time are purely defensive?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they are weapons of a defensive character.

Now, any weapon can be used offensively under certain circumstances, but these weapons normally associated with the defensive military establishment. If they develop other type weapons there, then we have another situation to look at.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I jump to the other hot question which we have been discussing?

NIBBLING ON BERLIN

One thing I have never clearly understood—perhaps it is because I don't understand fully the agreement on Berlin where Khrushchev is constantly nibbling at us on the West Berlin situation—why can't we nibble more with him on the East Berlin situation?

Secretary RUSK. The principal nibbling that continues to go on there is the escape of refugees from East Berlin. But in 1948 and 1949, when the four-power Kommandatura was abolished, when the Soviets walked out of it, and again in 1955 when the Soviets made their agreement with the East Germans, the effective control of East Berlin and East Germany did in fact pass to the Soviet Union.

The four-power commission, the control commission and the Kommandatura had not been operating for a very long time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. We never admitted that; we have never agreed to that, have we, though?

Secretary RUSK. No, that is right.

The legal situation continues the same but in fact the control has developed as I indicated.

Now, we are taking steps to prevent the Soviets nibbling at West Berlin in Berlin and in their negotiations attempting to get us out of Berlin we are taking a very definite and firm view on it. So this is the problem which is to prevent that kind of nibbling but I don't believe there is a great deal that can be done back into East Berlin except to take the refugees that come in and to work through the

West Germans working through trade arrangements to try to establish as many contacts as possible with East Germans and matters of that sort.

We have military personnel going in several times a day, but their effective presence doesn't mean a great deal in East Berlin.

AN AUTOMATIC SELF-BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN

Senator SALTONSTALL. It does seem to me—again, perhaps from not as much knowledge certainly as you have—if we took in working on a trade with them or trying to work the situations out, if we took some aggressive actions in relation to East Berlin, that we would have something to offset what they are trying to do with us in West Berlin.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the three Western powers and Germany have tried to find steps which could be taken of that sort which would not lead directly to, in effect, an automatic self-blockade of West Berlin. You see, it is a most uncomfortable physical situation there because the kind of step that you might take in retaliation might turn out to be simply a self-imposed limitation on yourself. That is one of the difficulties.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I see.

A TRADING PARTNERSHIP

May I ask just one more question. Following up what Senator Byrd and Senator Hickenlooper said with relation to the Common Market, one thing that disturbs me at the present time is if we go into a partnership and reciprocal trade partnership, which you say it is, from a political point of view, reciprocal trade from an economic point of view, and we don't know before we have to act on it in Congress this autumn what Britain is trying to do it seems to us we are putting ourselves into a partnership without knowing what the other partner is going to do.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think the partnership aspect of it is more a trading partnership than an organic partnership, just as we could continue to be a major trading partner with Canada and Japan.

But I think the prospects of the success of the Common Market negotiations today are if anything better than they were when the bill was first proposed to the Congress because they now have exposed fully the difficult questions, and despite the fact that difficult questions have been fully explored, there is a feeling that these negotiations will succeed.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You mean the British and the French?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Because if we go in and put ourselves in the position then my only worry was as to whether or not the attitude of the French and the Germans would change toward Great Britain if they had us pretty well tied up.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, I think in fact the trade bill does provide inducements in effect, for Britain for example, to come in in relation to their Commonwealth problems—the 80 percent free world production aspect of it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

MISSILES IN CUBA

Senator STENNIS. Secretary Rusk, you reviewed here, your idea was that the Soviets were using Cuba as a base for hemispheric action, particularly in Central and South America, as I understood it; now we had the facts stated here about bringing in the arms and so forth, and now what do we propose to do, and we have the President's statement that Senator Saltonstall brought up about not permitting those arms to spread to other countries to their peril. What do we propose to do now?

I know you can't predict events ahead but what are we going to do about stopping them? Have you any position on that and I don't mean to be premature.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, when I first referred to the Soviet interest in Cuba as a base in this hemisphere, I was not at that particular moment referring to a base in military terms, but as a place from which they could direct subversion and propaganda and so forth into Latin America. If any move were made by military means out of Cuba against any other countries, I would think there would be no question but we would retaliate with military action straightaway.

Senator STENNIS. That was the President's statement as I understood it, that we would not permit any launchings toward them but I don't just know when this buildup is going to stop being defensive and become offensive. Perhaps no one can say exactly. I just want to know if there is anything firm or are we just going to keep on letting them come in there in greater and greater volume, which will probably be the trend unless we do something about it.

That is the question, what do we propose to do about stopping them from coming in?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as the President's statement referred to certain contingencies that had not yet occurred—the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba, ground-to-ground missiles—the indication of that was a signal to the Soviets that the situation would be changed if they moved in those directions.

VIOLATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Senator STENNIS. I realize my question involves war plans to a degree, and perhaps you shouldn't disclose anything here if you had some plans now, but it seems to us like it violates the Monroe Doctrine just to permit them to bring in the amount they already have.

That is a school boy's idea of the Monroe Doctrine perhaps, but don't you think that this violates the basic concepts of the Monroe Doctrine—I mean what they have already done?

Secretary RUSK. As was agreed unanimously at Punta del Este, I think the existence in Cuba of the Marxist-Leninist system is contrary to the commitments of the inter-American system and cer-

tainly we go back to the type of threat for which the Monroe Doctrine was devised.

However, I don't think that means that the reaction to that kind of a threat has to be a flash reaction with all-out military force in a given set of circumstances. In most situations where the Monroe Doctrine has in fact been invoked it was applied diplomatically, politically, and all sorts of ways and the military action was in the background.

Now, the resort to force is always present, something that one could do at any moment. The more important, the more immediate problem is to deal with this situation.

DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA

Senator STENNIS. I certainly heartily agree with that and I haven't advocated any immediate blockade or invasion. But I certainly do think we need to be assured and the American people need to be assured that this thing is not going to be passed up, that something is going to be done about it, diplomatically if possible, and otherwise, if not possible, that steps are going to be taken of a positive nature, with no abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.

I know the channels are through the Organization of American States, but we don't know how long that would take if any action would come. I think we have to be prepared to move unilaterally and I imagine you have some plan along that line. Is there anything assuring to us, more assuring to us or to the people any time soon with reference to positive action along this line?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as far as direct action against Cuba is concerned, I don't think I could go beyond what the President said in his statement. But I do think there is action underway to be sure that this Castro movement is limited to Cuba and does not affect the rest of the hemisphere and does not get involved in illicit operations in the hemisphere and activities of that sort. I think that is step one.

Depending on the development of events, it may be that additional steps will have to be taken. We are today talking in the North Atlantic Council about further steps that our allies in Europe might well take in regard to Cuba because we believe it is expensive there, that Cubans are finding that this operation is not to their liking.

All the rationing and everything else that is going on is making its impact, the attempts to mobilize Cuban labor on a gang basis, causing reactions, all sorts of things are going on there. But so far as direct military action is concerned, I think the President's statement is sufficient.

Senator STENNIS. I don't want to take any more time, but what is going on, plus the fact that our NATO allies are furnishing the ships, and the atmosphere that is prevailing, this is building up rapidly in the minds of the American people. Some positive plan must be devised and for us to go on and announce a major part of it would perhaps be a waste of time. But still Secretary McNamara emphasized the deterrent effect of our striking power.

SENATOR KEATING'S CHARGES

If you don't have anything else to say on that, may I ask General Carter this question?

General Carter, are you familiar with facts that Senator Keating feels to be true, in effect in his speeches last week, you know about the number of cargoes and the number of men and ships and all?

General CARTER. They are reasonably accurate. There is nothing new that Senator Keating has brought out we have not already publicized.

Senator STENNIS. That is what I wanted to ask: Do you think they are reasonably accurate?

General CARTER. They conform to what we had already released, yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I didn't know you had released that before he spoke on it.

General CARTER. In general terms, sir. We have not run an analysis directly.

Senator STENNIS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. There—

GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES

Secretary Rusk. On that last statement, I think Senator Keating did refer to ground-to-air missiles. I think that had not been confirmed.

General CARTER. That had not been confirmed until this weekend.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to pursue the questions put by Senator Stennis.

Are we to understand that the continued shipment of technicians or troops and military equipment will be tolerated by our country and that we will only take action if and when it appears that those troops and the military equipment are being used against other nations in the hemisphere?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that is not exactly what the President's statement indicated. He indicated that at the present time the types of weapons which are going into Cuba are weapons normally associated with defense.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Secretary RUSK. Now, that itself might change, in which case we would have a changed situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I may put this question: If they are shipping in missiles that can be used in ground-to-air, and if they are equipping torpedo boats with missiles, why do you assume that they are not now sending in equipment of ground-to-ground attack?

Secretary RUSK. Would you wish to comment on that, General?

General CARTER. We don't assume they are not, sir. We have no confirmation, however, that they are.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

So you take the position, because you have no confirmation that they are, that therefore they are not sending in ground-to-ground missiles?

General CARTER. No, I don't think it is quite that way, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, put it in your own words.

General CARTER. We have no confirmation that they are sending any surface-to-surface missile type equipment into Cuba. We do not assume that they are not; we have no confirmation that they are.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your judgment then as to the situation? Do they or don't they have ground-to-ground?

General CARTER. Our judgment is that they do not have ground-to-ground.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are assuming then that because you have no information that they are sending in ground-to-ground, that therefore they do not have them?

General CARTER. Our judgment is that they do not have it. We are not assuming, however, that it could not be there nor that it may not come. We have no confirmations.

TORPEDO BOAT MISSILES

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the range of these missiles they have in the torpedo boats?

General CARTER. 15 miles.

Senator LAUSCHE. You do then have detailed information on that item?

General CARTER. Yes, sir. Those are 15-mile missiles, each motor torpedo boat carrying two of them. They have a 2,000 pound high explosive warhead, and are guided, radar-guided.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you have that detailed information on the missiles that are in the motor boats, how is it that you have no information on whether there are ground-to-ground or not?

General CARTER. Because our information indicates that there are no ground-to-ground missiles there.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is a different story.

Secretary RUSK. I think, if I may add, it needs a little clarification. I believe there is a variety of sources of information, some of great accuracy. If they are anything like installations that are used in ground-to-ground, I think those you would know something about.

General CARTER. We were bound to know something about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. How long have they been delivering this equipment?

General CARTER. Military equipment in some degree started being delivered to Cuba in July 1960, 2 years ago. But the bulk of what we are reporting now has come in since July of this year.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have Chinese troops come into Cuba?

General CARTER. We have had reports of Chinese technicians in Cuba.

SHORT RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt, you gentlemen are leaving. Do you wish to come back and ask some questions?

Senator JACKSON. I don't think I need to.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a vot- gentlemen, we have to go vote, but there may be others and I do to interrupt.

Senator JACKSON. If you I will come back and ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess for 5 minutes and come back.
 [Short recess.]

A DIRECT SECURITY THREAT TO U.S.

Senator LAUSCHE [presiding]. I would like to know just what the policy is with regard to Cuba.

It has been stated if there are evidences that ground-to-ground missiles were brought in, or if there is evidence of external action against neighboring countries, that would be a ground for taking firmer action than we have taken.

Is there any other condition that would induce us to act?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there are a number of things that are being done in the field of action with respect to this situation created by the Cuban problem. Most of those actions are being taken outside of Cuba.

If you are referring to actions in Cuba by the United States through its Armed Forces in overt formal action against that island, then that is a matter that has to be looked at in the full circumstances of the time, and in full relationship to our total confrontation with the Soviet bloc wherever it happens to be. I do not think it would be possible to anticipate precisely what the President would urgently do or decide to do in a number of contingencies, but he has made in certain ones of them—

Senator LAUSCHE. I wish you would interpret the meaning of what the President said, if such-and-such events occur, we will take action; what are those events?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think that the most direct and simplest one is that if any armed action is launched from Cuba against any of its neighbors, we would meet that immediately and directly with armed forces. That is one of the central purposes of his statement yesterday.

The second contingency would be where Cuba itself came to be a direct security challenge or threat to the United States. There the President indicated that we would be forced to take action. He did not specify the kind of action.

Senator LAUSCHE. When would that challenge to our security occur?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would not wish to commit the President—

Senator LAUSCHE. Because that is a very broad—

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. On this.

But I want to point out in his statement yesterday there was a very broad signal to the Soviet Union about two things that would involve that kind of problem: One of them, the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba and, second, this ground-to-ground missile situation.

SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA

Senator LAUSCHE. What would they have to do to establish a base? How far would they have to go?

Secretary RUSK. I think the actual basing of Soviet combat forces in Cuba.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that Castro is giving immediate citizenship to these people, thus claiming that they are citizens of Cuba and not outside military forces. Is there any truth to that?

Secretary RUSK. I have not heard that report, and I would think that is not a veil that would be difficult to pierce. I do not think that would make any difference.

Senator LAUSCHE. My information is, from people who are in close contact, that that is what is going to happen.

Secretary RUSK. Do you have any information on that?

General CARTER. No, we do not have a thing on it. It seems unlikely.

A VERY FLEXIBLE POSITION

Senator LAUSCHE. The President then has left himself a very flexible position in determining whether the security of our country will be endangered through the presence of military equipment and foreign personnel in Cuba; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, when we are talking about the great issues of war and peace in this modern world, that it is understandable and necessary for the President to reserve a degree of flexibility.

Now, there are certain points at which he has announced that our action would be—action A would follow situation B.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will tell you, frankly, why I am alarmed. I listened to the Secretary's description of the fatalities that will occur in an all-out war, and in a measure I inferred, Mr. Secretary, that because of this horrible destruction that would come we must be cautious in everything that we do, and I agree with that.

But while we are fearing the consequences, aren't we yielding all along the line. We yielded in Laos; we drove The Netherlands out of West New Guinea; we went as far as we could in trying to get a banning of the nuclear tests; we are sort of cringing in Cuba. That is the situation. How long can we go on? To me, we are appeasing.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me comment on two of the elements you questioned. I do not believe we are cringing in Cuba. What we are not doing is launching an all-out invasion on Cuba under present circumstances.

But in Laos, I think, let us see how this story comes out. I personally believe that the objective of getting all the foreigners out of Laos and leaving the Laotians there will be in the security interests of the free world. I do not believe the Laotians themselves will go Communist; I do not believe they will link themselves with the block to the north.

COMPARISON TO NEW GUINEA

I do want to correct very specifically, if I can, sir, the impression that you have that we drove the Dutch out of West New Guinea. The Dutch were incapable of making or unwilling to make a decision to pursue any other course than they, in fact, pursued.

They did not mobilize, Senator. They did not decide to fight for West New Guinea; they decided to get out of West New Guinea about a year ago. They decided to get out and preferred to turn it over to the United Nations, and for the United Nations to provide

for its future transfer. That did not work because they did not get the two-thirds majority.

But they did not mobilize; they did not give anybody anything to support. They would have been glad to have the Seventh Fleet and boys drafted out of Kansas and Pittsburgh to do something that the burghers of The Netherlands were not willing to do for themselves. It is true that the Foreign Minister wanted to pursue another policy for The Netherlands, but he could not get the Cabinet, nor could he get the Parliament to go along, and the Dutch society from top to bottom decided not to fight for West New Guinea.

Therefore, we decided it was not for us to be the gendarmes in that situation, particularly when they said in 1948 they would not negotiate on West New Guinea, which created the possibility that they would turn it over to Indonesia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where does the word emanate, or where did it emanate that they yielded to our persuasion?

Secretary RUSK. I think this is primarily an internal Dutch political problem in The Netherlands. The Dutch press and the Dutch leadership have indicated recently a much more different, rather different, view.

Mr. Chairman, may I go off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one more question and then I will close:

WESTERN COMMITMENT TO BERLIN

What is our policy with respect to West Berlin, Berlin, and East Berlin? What are the lines beyond which we will not allow the Soviets to go?

Secretary RUSK. The heart of it is the presence of the three Western Forces in West Berlin, the security and safety of West Berlin, and both military and civilian access to West Berlin, the visibility of West Berlin; those are not fundamental commitments.

We are unwilling to talk with the Soviets about dividing up West Berlin with them. We are perfectly willing to talk with the Soviets about an all-Berlin. We have said to them, "You can have your troops in East Berlin, as you did before. We will stay in West Berlin, but we are not going to share West Berlin with your troops or with neutrals or anybody else. This is a Western commitment."

So this is the point at which there is direct and, so far, unyielding confrontation—unyielding on their side because they have a major commitment of prestige to getting us out of West Berlin, and we are just not going to get out. So that is the interim nature of the crisis there.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do the captive nations enter at all into the discussion of the settlement of West Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the Czechs do have a fear, and an understandable hatred, for both the Germans and the Russians in view of their experience. I think, looking at their national policies, they would, for example, frankly prefer a divided Germany.

But on the issue of confrontation in Berlin, I think the Eastern European satellites are having a moderating effect in Moscow. I am

quite sure, for example, that the Polish Foreign Minister is urging moderation in Moscow because he understands what a Berlin crisis would do for Poland if it came to a real showdown.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

HUNGARIAN ISSUE AT U.N.

A final question: There has been a current rumor that there is a proposed arrangement with the Soviets that if the Soviets will go along with U Thant they will drop the Hungarian issue on the United Nations agenda. Is there any truth to that charge?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. There have been no discussions of any such—

Senator LAUSCHE. No discussion anywhere?

Secretary RUSK. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Just a couple of questions.

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, we put the Hungarian issue on the agenda for the next Assembly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Fine.

ILLEGITIMATE SHIPMENTS OF CUBAN ARMS AND AGENTS

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned with respect to Cuba that we would, of course, take appropriate action if Cuba is used as a base to launch military aggression into the Latin American community.

I do not think that is going to happen; I mean that is stating something we do not need to be concerned about for a long time. But what is our position with reference to the launching that is now under way, which is from within, sending agents into these various countries, which seems to me to be the next step?

Secretary RUSK. We have organized very close cooperation with the military intelligence and police organizations of the countries around the Caribbean to try to discover and block such things as illicit shipment of arms and movement of agents, and things of that sort.

Our principal unresolved problem in that direction has been the flow of students from Latin America to Cuba and back again, and this is partly because of the large amount of traffic that goes on that does not involve that movement, and the difficulty the Mexicans have of getting effective control of those who study in Mexico. The Special Security Committee of OAS set up at Punta del Este is setting up this week what further steps can be taken with respect to this flow of individuals simply by traveling to Cuba, get trained, and then come back home.

We have been able to do a little bit, not as much as we would like, about the movement of money which was going on with the Communist Parties in Latin America before Cuba. That movement of money does continue, and in the radio propaganda coming out of Cuba with their new powerful transmitter, that is a troublesome effort. But those are the three things we are most concerned about and working on.

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me this is the heart of the immediate problem. The other is long-range. If they are successful in this

area, obviously they are not going to worry about having to launch a military attack on any of their neighbors in order to achieve their objective. I just hope this will be pursued.

Let me ask you—

Secretary RUSK. There had been over the last 3 years, Senator Jackson, two or three instances of Cuban parties landing in other Latin American countries by ship.

Senator JACKSON. That is relatively minor, I assume.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. They are working through Mexico, and we are not getting a great deal of cooperation out of Mexico.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to say that we are getting more cooperation from Mexico [deleted].

Senator JACKSON. That is helpful.

The whole Latin American community is in such a mess internally that the easiest way to take them over is to do what they are doing, stir up trouble in each of the countries, based in Cuba.

Secretary RUSK. Funds going to Guatemala and to Venezuela are troublesome—the money there.

AGGRESSIVE BASES IN CUBA

Senator JACKSON. At what point are we going to make a finding that certain bases in Cuba are actually aggressive? Suppose they start building submarine facilities in Cuba; suppose that in that connection the Soviets turn over submarines, but we have reason to believe they will serve the real purpose of a Soviet submarine base facility in Cuba?

You see what is going to go on. They are going to do this piece by piece by piece. They are not going to do the overt thing that is going to give us a chance to really move. They are going to avoid that to the hilt.

Isn't this what they are going to do?

Secretary RUSK. I think this requires, this would be entirely probable, that would be the way they would move if they so intended. This requires a constant assessment of what is happening, what are the risks, and what is called for by way of counteraction, and I do not think—

Senator JACKSON. But it does seem to me that we are prone to talk about the obvious, and they are not going to do the obvious. I mean, we get the American people all stirred up about Russian troops—that there are Russian troops down there and they are about to make an attack on the United States. This is not the way they are going to operate.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is important to realize, Senator, that we do not see any signs, indeed any reason to believe, they are going to launch any overt military operation by organized forces against the countries in the Caribbean. But it is very important that the other countries in the Caribbean area understand this will not be allowed to happen and cannot happen.

AGGRESSION FROM WITHIN

Senator JACKSON. I agree on that, but I think there also should be a more vigorous effort undertaken in the area of subversion be-

cause this is where it is going to come. There is no area in the world that is any more ripe, at least, than Latin America for this type of aggression from within.

What is going on in Brazil and these other places is so sour that I do not envy your job at all. To me it is almost a matter of despair if you look at Latin America.

Well, my only other observation is that, of course, we can invoke the Monroe Doctrine any time we want if we want to make the finding that Mr. Castro is no longer a sovereign unto himself but he is directed by the Soviets; is that right?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think there will be any problem about finding the policy basis if under all these circumstances a particular action is wise to undertake, given our—

Senator JACKSON. I agree that once we decide we have to do a certain thing so far as making the Monroe Doctrine applicable, it would not be difficult on sound precedents.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I just have three or four questions. I was going to ask some questions along the line that had been asked by Senator Jackson and others about our policy in Cuba.

CUBA'S ALIGNMENT WITH COMMUNISM

How long are we going to stand by and permit Cuba to remain aligned with the international Communist conspiracy? Is there any definite action which is going to be taken at a definite time, or are they going to be allowed just to continue as they are now, and the threat to us, which is increasing all the while; or are we going to at some definite time say. "You are now part of the international Communist conspiracy, therefore we are going to take action to remove you from that alliance."

Secretary RUSK. Well, there is no set time in our minds that will be given as an answer to that question without regard to the development of circumstances. There could be circumstances under which it would be necessary to take that kind of direct action. I think there are a number of other actions, some of them known publicly, some not, that do have a bearing on the situation and may be of some help. But this is a matter that I just cannot give you a categorical answer on, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, don't you think Cuba's becoming stronger militarily and becoming further involved with the Communist conspiracy, that the longer we put that off the greater our task is going to be?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, given the nature of the total situation, if we get to a point where there is not any future in trying other means, that decision might have to be faced. But I would think at that point that the issues involved would be so grave that something—we should be sure that the country and possibly the hemisphere and as much of the free world be united on the necessity for it.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Rusk, suppose Russia signs a treaty with East Germany. What would be the policy of the United States? What will we do? Will we continue diplomatic relations or just what steps will we take?

Secretary RUSK. It depends a good deal on what, in fact, happens. They can go out into Siberia somewhere and sign a treaty at any time. The question is what the effect of that would be on our rights and on our position in West Berlin.

For example, we ourselves have signed a treaty with the West Germans in which we reserve to the Western Allies full disposition of all German questions such as a German peace treaty for all Germany, and reserve to ourselves the responsibility for Berlin. If the Soviets signed a peace treaty with the East Germans, so-called peace treaty with that kind of a reservation, that would be one thing; or they might do what they did in 1955, sign such a treaty and themselves put in a reservation reserving Soviet control of the Berlin questions. That would be another.

But if they signed a peace treaty and tried to apply it to our situation in West Berlin, then we would have a crisis—we would be right there; we would have a crisis, which we have all known could come about. But it is not the actual signing of the paper that is the critical thing. The critical thing is what they do about our presence and our access to Berlin.

Senator THURMOND. That would be the result of signing a treaty.

FOOD TO COMMUNIST NATIONS

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you this question which has caused to lot of comment in my section, and I think throughout other sections of the country, too. I presume you consider food as a weapon of war just as important as steel. If that is true, why do we continue to provide food to any Communist country which tends to build up the economy, which is, in turn, something which prepares it for war?

Secretary RUSK. It depends a good deal, Senator, on which country. In the case of Yugoslavia, for example, I think we have a basic interest in the continued independence of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and if assistance in food helps them maintain that independence, I think it is a good investment on our part.

In the case of Poland, I think that there is one of the places where a counter-offensive by the West is possible because of the strong sense of nationalism that one finds in Poland.

I remember 10 years ago the question was how can we take on a counter-offensive then behind the bloc. One of the ways we can take a counter-offensive is to get into a situation like Poland, get them some food, get some contacts between their leaders in science and industry and so forth and leaders in the West, to stimulate that nostalgic feeling of the Poles for the restoration of their relations with Western civilization, Western Europe.

I would think that these are matters of tactics, and have nothing to do with the question of supporting communism by feeding some Poles or some Yugoslavs.

Senator THURMOND. If we should have a showdown with Russia, whose side do you think Yugoslavia would be on?

Secretary RUSK. I would think Yugoslavia would probably, in the first instance—even over Berlin where they have some strong Yugoslav feelings of their own—I think they would probably stay out of it.

SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator THURMOND. Now, the last question I want to ask you is, it seems we in South Vietnam are trying to help hold South Vietnam since the Communist take-over. What is the objection to the South Vietnamese going north and clearing the Communists out of North Vietnam and cleaning the country of Communists? Won't there always be and continue to be in the future trouble and agitation there unless the Communists are cleaned out of Vietnam? What is the objection to insisting on their doing it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think this is one of those questions where one has to select the policy and pay the price. The South Vietnamese could not themselves take on this job in North Vietnam with the support of the bloc behind North Vietnam without a major military effort by the United States, which might very well lead to world war.

We ourselves believe that there is a better alternative to try to put the South Vietnamese in a position to fight their war in South Vietnam and win it there. It was won in Malaya, in the Philippines, in Burma, where this type of subversion was attempted. The South Vietnamese are fighting. The principal differences between them and the Laotians is that they are fighting and making some headway, and I would think this course is much preferable at this point to the all-out engagement that would be implicit in this question.

Senator THURMOND. Of course, that tactic was used in Korea when we did not win in Korea. Now we have two Koreas; we have two Chinas; we have two Vietnams. As long as we do, we are going to have agitation, and we are going to have trouble. We have to start with winning; we have to start with taking the offensive. As long as we just stay on the defensive in dealing with the Communists, we won't win, in my judgment.

Secretary RUSK. I think there are many ways in which we can take the offensive, and one of the most important is in the field of foreign aid. I think these men we have outside the United States in uniform are part of the necessary security and defense of the free world, and those are there for that purpose. It may be necessary to engage them.

Senator THURMOND. I thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CUBA AS A VIOLATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Mr. Secretary, I take it from what you have said already that insofar as Cuba is concerned you do not consider the actions now

being taken as being in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, based on the information I have?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I would not be that categorical about it, because I think the recognition by all the hemisphere states, for example, at Punta del Este was that the existence of the Marxist-Leninist regime is incompatible with the American system and, at the same time, saying that this is a system which is contrary to the basic doctrine involved in the Monroe Doctrine.

However, that does not, it seems to me, mean that we move automatically toward an attempted military solution by an American assault on Cuba.

Senator CANNON. Then your belief is there is actually a violation, but the question is what method to pursue to counteract that violation?

Secretary RUSK. I think, by and large, the development in Cuba is contrary to the purposes and intent of the Monroe Doctrine and, indeed, the Inter-American System.

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING

Senator CANNON. Senator Russell raised a question that I am much concerned about, and that is the changing of our position with respect to nuclear testing and disarmament, and the apparent change of position even though you say we know that the Russians are not going to agree. I wonder if you can say categorically that we will not agree to a nuclear test ban without having adequate rights of on-site inspection?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think I can say that entirely, because this is crucial to any test ban that would involve underground tests.

Senator CANNON. Could you also say categorically that we will not proceed to enter into any disarmament agreement without adequate on-site inspection provisions?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CANNON. And then don't you think it is important that we try to—

Secretary RUSK. May I just qualify that in this sense, there may be certain aspects of the disarmament agreement that would not for itself call for or require inspection. For example, if the Soviets bought our proposal to turn over certain weapons of fissionable grade material that would not itself require a count except for what was turned over.

Senator CANNON. Don't you think it is important, so far as particularly our own people are concerned, that we not take actions that might mislead them?

Many people in our own country here have the idea that when we come out and say that we are going to lessen the number of inspection requirements, even though we know the reason for it, we know that it is because you have advanced your technology insofar as detection is concerned. But this to the American public and to many people means a different thing; it means that we are giving up, we are entering into more concessions to try to get an agreement.

Don't you think it is important that our position be made a little more clear in that regard?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is one of the reasons why I mentioned earlier why it was we were refusing to talk about numbers of inspections at Geneva, and the real reason for it is this point that we do not want to negotiate about the numbers with people to whom it does not make any difference. I recognize the inability to be precise on what does leave the way open for misgivings here at home by what might be involved.

The essential thing is that there must be adequate on-site inspections to give us assurance that the other side is not cheating if we go into a test ban that eliminates underground testing, and the President's approach to this has been based on the security interests of the United States and will continue to be.

So it would be difficult for us for the reason I indicated earlier to talk about precise numbers. I think that would tend to help reassure people here.

EAST GERMAN COMMANDANT IN BERLIN

Senator CANNON. With respect to Berlin and the Soviets turning over or putting the East German Commandant in charge, what significance does that have insofar as we are concerned?

Secretary RUSK. That particular move in itself did not actually amount to anything because the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, so-called, had pretty much dropped out of the function years ago. He was reduced to a Colonel in rank; he was there. There was very little business transacted with him. He was a relatively junior officer in the Soviet military hierarchy.

That position was eliminated as a Soviet position. We got to such questions as insisting that they move from Friedrichstrasse to Sandkrug Bridge to get to the Soviet War Memorial and we had the Soviet Commander, in fact, operating on that question as, in fact, he was the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, so I would not think myself there was any importance with respect to him.

Senator CANNON. You say you dealt with the Soviet Commander?

Secretary RUSK. No, the Soviet Commander of their forces in East Germany.

Senator CANNON. I see. You did not have to deal with the East German people.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. We said to the Soviets that before and after they took this step that there is no way in which the Soviets can transfer to the East Germans their responsibility to us, and there is no way in which they can put our rights at the disposal of the East Germans.

Senator CANNON. So it is our intention then, for all intents and purposes, to just completely disregard the fact that they have supposedly turned the control over to the East Berliners.

Secretary RUSK. That is right; and continue to deal with the Soviets.

SOVIET REARMAMENT PROGRAM

Senator CANNON. You made a statement earlier that kind of raised a question in my mind. You made the statement that the

Soviets had made a very significant armament build-up program or rearmament program.

Now, that raised a question in my mind because at the same time we are saying that they have less ICBM's now than we thought they were going to have a short time ago; we know they have a much smaller long-range bomber force now than we thought they were going to have a short time ago, and they have demobilized a substantial number of their personnel in a very recent period of time.

So I am wondering, would you explain to us what have they done to build up their rearmament or their armament program?

Secretary RUSK. The Secretary of Defense may wish to comment on this. It was partly the result of more accurate information about what they have.

These tests of theirs are part of the development of additional nuclear missile weaponry, but I think the Secretary of Defense ought to comment.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think we can say they stopped a reduction of their conventional forces, particularly their ground forces. Their previous plans called for their forces to be at a lower strength today than they are. This, I think, is a clear indication of shift in military planning.

They appear to have recently placed greater emphasis upon the development of missile-carrying submarines, including the possible development of Polaris-type submarines, that is to say, nuclear-powered missile-carrier submarines with capabilities to launch missiles below the surface. So far as we know they have none of those operational at the present, but there is information to indicate they plan to develop such launchers.

They appear to have held back from deploying any substantial numbers of what might be called their first generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, recognizing its serious deficiencies and anticipating they could design around these and introduce a second generation missile which, we believe, they are doing at the present time and which they appear to be accelerating the production of, although, as I stated, their force today and their rate of increase for the future appears substantially less than ours.

REDUCING THE RATE OF DISARMAMENT

Senator CANNON. Well, then, actually as far as their present strength is concerned, they have not undergone any substantial rearmament program to beef them up as of this moment, but you would say it was in the planning stage from the standpoint of nuclear submarines or Polaris-type submarine capability, and also second generation ICBMs?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would say they have changed their previous plans for reducing the size of their ground forces. I think that is very clear.

Senator CANNON. Well, they have reduced the rate of their disarmament then. The thing that raised the question was because the Secretary said they had undergone a very significant rearmament program.

Now, that does not seem to me to be rearmament. It seems to me to be just a slow-up of what appeared before to be a disarmament program insofar as the present posture is concerned, and I just wanted to get it clear in my own mind as to what the facts were.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I should explain the basis for my statement, and if the Secretary of Defense has another way to explain it, he will express it.

I think that the Soviets have, say, 2 years, in fact, had less than we thought they had; that they also knew that we had increasing power for a nuclear force that made it necessary for them to take additional steps to develop their nuclear force and, therefore, there was a very important military decision to break the so-called moratorium and renew their testing, and this was part of the build-up in the missile nuclear testing, not beyond our earlier estimates but beyond what they had.

I cannot be sure of this, but I suspect, and perhaps General Carter will comment on it, that they are building up more than they had planned building at this point, so Mr. Khrushchev has talked about the effect of our own build-up. He is blaming the rationing in the Soviet Union and the higher prices on defense necessity, and it sounds as though they have stepped up for them their military program.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think I would agree on that. We got into a problem of estimates here. They have less than we previously estimated they would have, and I think it is very important to recognize that.

They have substantially less than we have today, but they probably—and I can only say probably because I have no certainty with respect to this next statement—are spending more on arms today in total than they planned to spend today. The evidence that we have points to that.

SOVIET MISSILE PRODUCTION

Senator CANNON. In other words, our evidence now would indicate not only did they not go ahead as fast as we thought they were going to in the bomber area, they did not go ahead as fast as we thought they were in the missile area.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator CANNON. But they are apparently taking steps now, and particularly in the submarine area and in the second generation—

Secretary McNAMARA. Missile area, exactly.

Senator CANNON. Missile area.

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Senator CANNON. General, do we have any specific information as to what they are coming up with now in the way of a second generation missile in light of the association of tests that they undertook?

General CARTER. I would like to revert to Mr. Whitman, sir, who is our expert on that.

However, it appears that they have stopped entirely the first generation missiles and the missiles that Secretary McNamara in-

formed you of earlier are the second generation sophisticated missiles.

Senator CANNON. Fifty ICBM's?

General CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. They are second generation?

General CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Are they solid or liquid fuel?

STATEMENT OF JOHN WHITMAN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WHITMAN. They are liquid fuel and they are considerably smaller and easier to handle than the rather giant first generation which they started out with.

Senator CANNON. Is there any indication as to whether they are storable liquids?

Mr. WHITMAN. Storable liquids, yes.

Senator CANNON. Fast reaction time?

Mr. WHITMAN. Not very fast reaction. They have not sought anything like the 15-minute reaction time we built into the Minuteman.

Senator CANNON. Do we have anything, any information, about their rate of build-up now in the missile area, in the ICBM area?

Mr. WHITMAN. The rate of build-up so far, sir, the 50 that we estimate, has come about in the last 9 and 10 months, primarily.

Senator CANNON. Do you think the entire 50 have come in during that time?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Did they wash out the others that they supposedly had a year ago, for example?

Mr. WHITMAN. The first generation?

Senator CANNON. Yes.

Mr. WHITMAN. Insofar as it was deployed, they held it.

Senator CANNON. They held it?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes.

Senator CANNON. Are they doing any build-up in the MRBMs, or is this 500 figure about—does that appear to be what their level would be?

Mr. WHITMAN. We think they are going somewhat higher on this, up into the 550, 650 range. They are very near the end, but not completely.

Senator CANNON. Not an appreciable degree higher?

Mr. WHITMAN. No, sir.

Senator CANNON. Do you have any current information as to whether they are doing anything in the long-range bomber area now?

Mr. WHITMAN. They seem to have stabilized that. They are not—we do not know of any new bombers that they are planning to put into production, and they are holding what they have and we expect as they undergo attrition, there will be a gradual decline in that force.

Senator CANNON. What about their other aircraft that they showed at the last Tushino show?

Mr. WHITMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Have they appeared to go into production with any of those?

Mr. WHITMAN. One not at all, and the other apparently is a civil aircraft in its civil version.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think that covers my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, we appreciate very much your coming down.

Senator RUSSELL. Can I ask just one or two questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

AMERICAN AID TO INDONESIA

Senator RUSSELL. There are just one or two questions raised in my mind with respect to Secretary Rusk's referring to foreign aid.

I was interested in your categorical statement to Senator Lausche that we had nothing whatever to do with forcing the Dutch out of West New Guinea because I certainly had a contrary view, and I think the press generally has carried it as if we were certainly discouraging that.

I understand that the Dutch have been spending from \$25 to \$45 million a year—that they have had that much loss there. Have we agreed to furnish any funds to Sukarno and picking up their tab there?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. The arrangements on financing would be that the Dutch and the Indonesians share the costs during the United Nations period of trusteeship, and then the Indonesians take over the costs after transfer to Indonesia.

Senator RUSSELL. If they are not able to do it, would they expect us to do it or the Russians or who?

Secretary RUSK. There is no discussion of U.S. aid for that purpose. I think the types of aid we had in mind will not be available for general budgetary support of that sort in West New Guinea. There may be some technical assistance or things of that sort in the general aid program that would include that.

INDEPENDENCE OF SURINAM

Senator RUSSELL. I read from a newspaper article where the people in Surinam, I believe that is one of the names, were debating whether or not to get independent status from Holland so that they could get more money out of us than from the Dutch.

Did you see that article?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I did not see that.⁶

Senator RUSSELL. I have it in my office. I was very much interested in whether it was more probable on their part profitably to be independent and stay on the dole here than to stay with the Dutch.

Secretary RUSK. We would not want to encourage that idea because one of our main efforts in the OECD is to try to get these countries who had a former colonial relationship with these independent countries, former colonial countries, to keep their backs in there and continue to give the kind of support they gave during the colonial period.

⁶ See Appendix D.

AID TO TRINIDAD AND WEST INDIES

Senator RUSSELL. We are encouraging that idea with Trinidad and others celebrating their independence. We had Mr. Hamilton ⁷ there on hand as a symbol of American foreign aid programs, did we not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. We had—

Senator RUSSELL. He was representing us down there. We had already advanced them a great deal of money for housing and other purposes down there before they became independent.

Secretary RUSK. There had been an aid program for the British West Indies, but we were very much expecting the British to continue to put in the kind of assistance they had put in when they were responsible for these countries.

It is true a developing country finds itself facing larger needs, and an independent country would tend to want to go faster. Therefore, they will be looking for larger assistance than they had when they were a colony. But actually Mr. Hamilton's presence there was due to last minute arrangements. We had to find a high official who could go to the place of someone else.

Senator RUSSELL. I thought it was rather symbolic that Mr. Hamilton was there, in view of Dr. Williams' statement particularly.

How about all through the Antilles, having become independent, the Barbados and otherwise, have we any information from our consular agent in that area as to whether they expect us to take up where the British have not been giving them?

Secretary RUSK. There has been very little along that line. The prospect seems to be—

Senator RUSSELL. Jamaica, too, while you are discussing that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. There will be three independent states coming out of what was expected to be the British West India Federation.

Senator RUSSELL. That fell apart. Jamaica would not go along.

Secretary RUSK. Jamaica and Trinidad separately, and a combination of the smaller groups as a third. But that is still quite a way down the track, and we had not gotten into direct aid discussions with them.

Senator RUSSELL. Of course, the Bahamas never were in the Federation, I believe.

Secretary RUSK. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. They did not need anything other than American tourists, I suppose, to keep them going.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate your taking the time to come down here.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

Do you have any suggestions at all as to what we might say to the press? They will be in here. We cannot avoid them. Do you wish for us to be very general?

⁷ Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID).

Secretary RUSK. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, if you and Senator Russell and Secretary McNamara agree, since we had certain points stated frankly this morning, figures and things that had been given, we think it should be quite general about the briefing with respect to the world situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I intended to be very general. They usually ask, though, was he optimistic. Are you optimistic?

Secretary RUSK. Diplomacy has to work on an optimistic basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be at all out of the way, Mr. Secretary, that we say that you are quite confident of the present military strength of this country? Would you care for us to make any reference to, say, that kind of thing?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be appropriate?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am going to propose to say to the press that any comment will come from the chairmen of the committees.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not think it would hurt for us to say anything to the effect that a great many questions were asked particularly about Cuba but that most of the answers were covered in the President's statement this morning, or something like that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMEN. I propose to be very general, but I just thought—

Secretary RUSK. I thought perhaps Secretary McNamara and I might just not make a statement as we go out and leave it to the chairmen.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Russell is going to carry on.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Because we value very much the executive nature of this discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very helpful for both committees to clarify a great many things. I think you have done a wonderful job in both of your initial statements which I thought were helpful, and I personally think they are reassuring.

I have no illusions that this is going to get over next week or next year. I think your summary as to the prospects of its continuing a series of crises and troubles is exactly what I see. But I agree with you—I would rather have our problems than theirs. I mean, we both have problems, but I think they have worse ones. In that sense it is optimistic.

Thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committees adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee entered an executive session at 11:10 a.m., in room F-53, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Carlson, the committee voted to report favorably the nomination of Abba P. Schwartz to be Administrator, Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State.

Without objection, the committee also voted favorably to report the nomination of Tom Killefer to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee voted to report the nomination of John J. Seigenthaler to be a Member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information.

The nomination of Francis H. Russell to be Ambassador to the Republic of Tunisia was approved for report.

On motion by Senator Morse, and without objection, the committee approved for report as Representatives and Alternate Representatives to the United Nations the nominations of Adlai E. Stevenson, Francis T. P. Plimpton, Senators Albert Gore and Gordon Allott, Arthur H. Dean, Charles W. Yost, Philip M. Klutznick, Jonathan B. Bingham, Marietta P. Tree, and Carl T. Rowan.

A Foreign Service list of promotions and appointments was also approved for report.

On motion by Senator Morse and without objection the committee voted to report the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Executive B, 87th Congress, 2nd Session).

The committee approved an original resolution for report to print the committee's study on the Common Market.

The committee discussed a paper prepared by the committee staff suggesting proposed phases for study in the committee's current inquiry into the non-diplomatic activities of representatives of foreign governments in the United States, and asking for guidance on them. On motion by Senator Carlson, seconded by Senator Morse, the outlines proposed by the staff were approved unanimously.